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Toward a Feminist Theory of the Rural 
The (con)fusion between women’s situation and women’s identity  
pervades public discourse.1
Judith Baer (1999) 
Given the pervasiveness of the rural/urban opposition and its related 
significance in the construction of identity, it is remarkable that the 
explosion of scholarly interest in identity politics has generally failed to 
address the rural/urban axis.  The resulting representation of social 
distinctions primarily in terms of race, class, and gender thus masks the 
extent to which these categories are inflected by place identification.2
Barbara Ching and Gerald Creed (1997) 
 
Feminist scholars have long lamented law’s inattentiveness to and 
misunderstanding of the day-to-day realities of women’s lives.3 Anti-essentialists have 
argued that feminism must look beyond gender as the sole site of subordination to other 
factors, such as race, class, and sexual orientation, which shape women’s lives, including 
their encounters with law.  I draw on both arguments in this article as I call attention to 
rural women as a distinct population, differentiated by place.  I argue that the social, 
political and economic realities that shape rural women’s lives are largely ignored in 
many legal contexts.  In the rare cases when they are acknowledged, the role that this 
 
1 JUDITH BAER, OUR LIVES BEFORE THE LAW 63 (1999).  “If we fail to discuss what has been done to 
women, we leave out a huge part of reality.  We limit the insights we can reach about people who do these 
things and about a society that lets them do it and teaches them how.”  Id. at 62.      
2 KNOWING YOUR PLACE: RURAL IDENTITY AND CULTURAL HIERARCHY 3 (Barbara Ching & Gerald 
Creed, eds., 1997). Professors Ching and Creed have also argued that “[t]he rural/urban distinction 
underlies many of the power relations . . . .” and that “the city remains the locus of political, economic and 
cultural power.”  Id. at 17.    
3 See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS 6, 34 (2005) (arguing that we 
“should analyze the legal issues in terms of the real issues, and strive to move law so that the real issues are 
the legal issues”); BAER, supra note 1, at 40-67 (advocating “situation jurisprudence,” which focuses on 
women’s situation and what has been done to women and criticizing “character jurisprudence,” which 
emphasizes “essential gender distinctions”).  
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critical factual context plays in defining women’s choices is often downplayed or 
dismissed in relation to the legal issue at hand.   
 I discuss below the relevance of place to rural women’s situation in three different 
contexts:  domestic violence, termination of parental rights, and abortion.  With respect to 
each of these, I assess whether and how the relevant legal doctrines sufficiently 
accommodate information about the lived realities of rural women.  I reveal, for example, 
that legal analyses of domestic violence and termination of parental rights often ignore or 
discount the added vulnerability and hardship that rural women often experience by 
virtue of their rural setting.  In the abortion context, I illustrate how courts have 
consistently dismissed or denied the structural barriers that prevent many rural women 
from exercising their constitutional right to an abortion.   
In Part I, I detail the rural milieu, to the extent that it can be generalized across 
regions, with particular focus on the structural disadvantages under which rural people 
labor.  These disadvantages stem from poor economic and educational opportunity 
generally, as well as inadequate housing, transportation, and child care, specifically.  
While a great deal of the information I present as a foundation to my argument relates to 
the socioeconomic disadvantage that marks rural people and places, my argument is not 
merely based upon class.4 It is also about other characteristics of rural America, such as 
spatial isolation, lack of anonymity within communities, and social norms that value 
men’s autonomy and women’s dependency. 
 
4 See Ann R. Tickamyer, Public Policy and Private Lives:  Social and Spatial Dimensions of Women’s 
Poverty and Welfare Policy in the United States, 84 KY. L. J. 721 (1995-96) (discussing the feminization of 
poverty).   See also Diane Pearce, The Feminization of Poverty: Women, Work and Welfare, 11 THE URBAN 
& SOCIAL CHANGE REV. 28, 29 (1978) (citing D.S. Knudsen, The Declining Status of Women: Popular 
Myths and the Failure of Functionalist Thought, SOCIAL FORCES, 1969) (noting that the higher the 
percentage of workers who are female in a given occupation, the lower the occupation’s average income). 
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In Part II, I provide a theoretical framework for conceptualizing rural women’s 
differences as disadvantage and for arguing that place merits attention in our analysis of 
many gender issues.  Drawing on the work of Catharine MacKinnon, I assert that we 
must attend to the details of women’s lives – that we should “strive to move law so that 
the real issues are the legal issues.”5 Based on the work of Judith Baer, I argue that we 
must focus on women’s situation rather than on their character.6 In this regard, I reveal 
the aggravated disadvantage and multi-faceted vulnerability that rural women experience 
by virtue of place and the spatiality of social relations.  Building on anti-essentialist 
scholarship, I argue that geography matters, just as race, sexual orientation, and other 
factors do.  Rurality is highly relevant to many legal analyses, even though law has rarely 
recognized it.  Being a rural woman may thus represent a significant component of 
identity.  Just as being a woman of color is a greater element of identity than being 
white,7 being a rural woman can be a critical aspect of how one sees oneself, even though 
being an urban woman may not be.  
Part III discusses three different contexts in which courts have had an opportunity 
to consider how characteristics of rural areas influence adjudication of cases:  domestic 
abuse, termination of parental rights, and abortion.  In discussing each of these, I 
illustrate law’s ignorance of – or indifference to – rural realities.  I also contrast law’s 
 
5 MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS supra note 3, at 34.   
6 BAER essentially renames dominance theory, associated with radical feminists, situation theory.  She 
explains that “the implication that dominance is a universal feature of women’s lives is contentious, the 
assertion that women’s situation has been a subject one is incontrovertible.”  She thus refers to theories that 
emphasize dominance as theories of women’s situation.  “Situation theory (jurisprudence) holds that what 
makes law male is the fact that men use it to subordinate women.”  BAER, supra note 1, at 41. 
7 Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 604 (1990) 
(anecdote of West Coast fem critics meeting at which all women were asked to pick two or three words to 
describe themselves; none of the white women mentioned race, while all of the women of color did).   In 
each pairing, black/white and rural/urban, the former is the outsider, the minority, while the latter 
represents the default or the norm.  It is thus the former about which society must be educated and 
sensitized.    
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typically insensitive responses to these women-specific issues with more empathic 
judicial handling of non-gendered legal issues that similarly implicate the spatial isolation 
and lack of anonymity characteristic of rural areas.  
While law has many definitions of the term “rural,”8 I use it in this article 
primarily to connote sparsely populated places.9 But rural places have more in common 
than low population density, and I also use the term to refer to the conglomeration of 
characteristics generally associated with rural areas:  close-knit community where 
residents tend to be familiar with one another, more tradition-bound and conservative 
thinking, the spatial isolation created by low population density, and socioeconomic 
disadvantage.   
By my claim “toward a feminist theory of the rural,” I do not purport to articulate 
“epic theory”10 as MacKinnon did in her germinal text under a similar title.11 Rather, my 
aim is to theorize how rural women have been disadvantaged by law’s ignorance of – or 
callousness about – the practical realities that shape their lives.  In positing how law’s 
urban presumption and bias have undermined rural women, I re-conceptualize the 
significance of rurality to women’s lives, particularly as those lives encounter the law.    
 
8 See Lisa R. Pruitt, Rural Rhetoric, CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) at Part II.   
9 The distances typical of rural areas go hand in hand with the fact that “all rural areas share one common 
characteristic: relatively low population densities.”  BRUCE A. WEBER, GREG J. DUNCAN & LESLIE A. 
WHITENER, RURAL DIMENSIONS OF WELFARE REFORM: WELFARE, FOOD ASSISTANCE AND POVERTY IN 
RURAL AMERICA 7, 456 (2002).   
10 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE x (1989) (citing Sheldon 
Wolin, Political Theory as a Vocation, 63 AM. POLITICAL SCIENCE REV. 1087-80 (1967)).  
11 Id.  
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I:  Rural Women, Rural Realities 
 
Rural scholars warn that diversity among the country’s rural places makes it 
difficult to generalize accurately about the rural populace.12 Yet, studies of women in 
areas ranging from Appalachian Kentucky to rural Michigan reveal some similarities.  
Rural women’s lives are shaped by conservative views, including those regarding the 
proper roles of women.13 Their educational attainment is relatively low,14 and they are 
often under-employed.15 
A. Political and Social Trends. 
Some social and cultural differences between rural and urban areas dissipated or 
disappeared with the decline of the family farm and the corresponding decrease in rural 
population.16 Family size and birth rates are now similar in rural and urban areas,17 and 
advances in transportation and communication have reduced rural isolation.18 Despite 
some blurring between rural and urban in recent decades, however, rural individuals still 
tend to hold more traditional beliefs than those who live in cities.19 Sociologists attribute 
this, at least in part, to the types of relationships rural people form as a result of decreased 
 
12 Cynthia B. Struthers & Janet L. Bokemeier, Myths and Realities of Raising Children and Creating 
Family Life in a Rural County, 21 J. OF FAMILY ISSUES 17, 41 (2000).  See also infra note 306.   
13 Public Opinion Strategies and Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, Report for the W.K. Kellogg 
Foundation, Election 2002: Rural Voter and Rural Issues, 37 (2002), available at 
http://www.wkkf.org/DesktopModules/WKF_DmaItem/ViewDoc.aspx?
fld=PDFFile&CID=4&ListID=28&ItemID=43791&LanguageID=0. “Rural women are actually stronger 
GOP partisans than their male counterparts, are more supportive of conservative religious groups, [and] are 
more conservative than non-rural men on self-reported ideology...”  Id.  
14 Id. at 24.  Forty-two percent of rural women have attained a high school education or less compared with 
24 percent of urban women.  Twenty-six percent completed some college, as opposed to 30 percent of 
urban women; 32 percent graduated from college or went beyond, compared with 45 percent of metro 
women.   
15 J. Brian Brown & Daniel T. Lichter, Poverty, Welfare, and the Livelihood Strategies of Non-metropolitan 
Single Mothers, 69 RURAL SOC’Y 282, 295 (2004).   
16 Don E. Albrecht & Carol Mulford Albrecht, Metro/Non-metro Residence, Nonmarital Conception, and 
Conception Outcomes, 69 RURAL SOC’Y 430, 433 (2004). 
17 Id. at 435. 
18 Id. at 433. 
19 Id. at 449-50.   
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population size and density: the closer interaction among people within a rural 
community leads to “greater levels of consensus on important values and morals.”20 
The conservative views of so-called non-metro21 residents are evident in rural 
voting tendencies.  Until the latter part of the 20th century, rural voters aligned themselves 
with Democratic candidates who “tapped into the economic concerns of rural districts.”22 
But the 2002 elections marked the fifth consecutive election in which rural voters 
overwhelmingly supported Republican candidates,23 and President Bush carried the vast 
 
20 Id. at 435. 
21 I use the word “non-metro” to indicate “rural” when the study cited uses the Offfice of Management and 
Budget’s designations of metro and non-metro, which are defined slightly differently than the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s “rural.”  Housing Assistance Council, Taking Stock: Rural People, Poverty, and Housing at the 
Turn of the 21st Century, December 2002, at 11, available at 
http://ruralhome.org/pubs/hsganalysis/ts2000/index.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2006) [hereinafter Taking 
Stock]. The U.S. Census Bureau uses the term rural to mean “all territory, population, and housing units 
located outside of urbanized areas and urban clusters with a population of 2,500 or less.”  It defines urban 
as including all territory, population, and housing units located within an "urbanized area" or "cluster." 
U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Urban and Rural Classification, available at 
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/ua/ua_2k.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2006).  This definition delineated the 
boundaries of "urbanized areas" and "urban clusters" to encompass densely settled territory, which consists 
of: (1) "core census block groups or blocks that have a population density of at least 1,000 people per 
square mile, and (2) surrounding census blocks that have an overall density of at least 500 people per 
square mile."  Id. 
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) uses the terms metropolitan (metro) and non-
metropolitan (non-metro) to refer to essentially the same dichotomy. Non-metro areas are outside 
metropolitan areas and have no cities of 50,000 or more.  Metro areas, on the other hand, are those with at 
least 50,000 residents or with an urbanized area of 50,000 or more and total area population of at least 
100,000.  Metro areas thus include suburbs and other areas near them that are socially and economically 
integrated. Office of Management and Budget: Standards for Defining Metropolitan and Micropolitan 
Statistical Areas (December 27, 2000), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/estimates/00-
32997.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2006). Some scholars have pointed out that the definition of  non-metro 
areas is a narrow one that excludes 29 million people who live in small towns with fewer than 2500 
residents or in open territory, but who are classified as metro because they are within a metro county.   
RURAL DIMENSIONS OF WELFARE REFORM, supra note 9, at 19, n.4.  I nevertheless treat the terms as 
essentially synonymous for my purposes because both refer to sparsely populated areas that are removed 
from urban centers.  See also Rural Rhetoric, supra note 8 (analyzing complexities of rural classification). 
22 Gregory L. Giroux, Recalibrating the Rural Voter’s Place, CQ Weekly, June 23, 2005.   
23 W.K. Kellogg Foundation, Cultural Issues in Rural America Gave Republicans a Wide Margin of 
Success in Recent Election: Gender Gap Narrower among Rural Voters, Rural Voter Study Shows (2002), 
available at  
http://www.wkkf.org/DesktopModules/WKF_DmaItem/ViewDoc.aspx?fld=PDFFile&CID=4&ListID=28
&ItemID=43792&LanguageID=0#search=%22rural%20voters%20(%22tabid%3D101%22%20OR%20%2
2ViewDoc.aspx%22%20OR%20%22tabid%3D55%22)%22 (last visited Sept. 2, 2006). 
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majority of rural districts in both the 2000 and the 2004 Presidential races.24 This change 
has been attributed to conservative views espoused by Republicans on topics that rural 
voters feel strongly about, including gun control, abortion, and religion.25 When rural 
communities do elect Democrats to Congress, their voting records are more conservative 
than those of urban Democrats.26 
As for rural women, they tend to marry younger and at a greater rate than urban 
women.27 Rural women also have a tendency toward more traditional views about 
women, believing that their primary role is to bear, raise and protect children.28 Non-
metro women’s views about abortion are generally more conservative than those of their 
urban counterparts, with rural women significantly more likely to support pro-life rather 
than pro-choice candidates. 29 A study of nonmarital conceptions among rural and urban 
women found that those in rural areas were more likely to carry a fetus to term and to 
marry before the baby’s birth.30 
24 CQ Weekly, Who Represents the Different Demographics (2005).  In 2000, Bush beat Gore in 47 of the 
61 rural districts, and in 2004 he beat Kerry in 51 districts.  Gore carried 70 of the 90 urban districts in 
2000.  In 2004, Kerry won in 65.   
25 Id.
26 Giroux, supra note 22, at 1724. “In most cases, rural-district Democrats have voting records in line with 
their conservative-leaning constituencies but at odds with their party’s more liberal leaders.  As of 
Memorial Day, four of the five House Democrats who hade the lowest ‘party unity’ scores so far this 
year—meaning that they often voted with the Republicans  and against most fellow Democrats on mainly 
party-line votes—came from rural districts…”  Id.   
27 Struthers & Bokemeier, supra note 12, at 34. 
28 JUDITH IVY FIENE, THE SOCIAL REALITY OF A GROUP OF RURAL, LOW-STATUS, APPALACHIAN WOMEN,
41 (1993).   See also Struthers & Bokemeier supra note 12, at 28. 
29 Public Opinion Strategies and Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, supra note 13, at 36-37.  Forty-four 
percent of rural women would vote for a pro-life candidate; only 29 percent would vote for a pro-choice 
candidate.  Thirty-four percent of urban women would vote for a pro-life candidate while 45 percent would 
vote pro-choice.   
In addition, rural women surveyed in New York and Kentucky voiced extreme anti-abortion 
sentiments.  See JANET FITCHEN, POVERTY IN RURAL AMERICA: A CASE STUDY (1981) (indicating strong 
opposition to abortion among New York women interviewed); FIENE, supra note 28, at 44-45 (indicating 
Kentucky women’s rejection of abortion even when the pregnancy results from rape). 
30 Albrecht & Albrecht, supra note 16, at 444, 447. 
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B.  Poor Economic Opportunities, Major Structural Disadvantages  
More than 55 million people – almost 20% of Americans – live in non-metro 
areas.31 Of the 14.6 percent of these living in poverty,32 women, children and people of 
color represent a disproportionate share.33 Indeed, about one-third of non-metro, female-
headed households live in impoverished conditions.34 
Myriad reasons account for rural women’s poverty, among them the limited 
economic opportunities and deficits in human capital that plague rural communities.  
While the 2000 census reported a median household income in metro areas of $44,755, 
the median income in non-metro areas was only $33,687, about three-quarters of the 
metro level.35 Indeed, non-metro workers earn, on average, 28 percent less than their 
metro counterparts.36 This is no doubt related to the fact that only 15 percent of non-
metro residents have at least a bachelor’s degree, compared to 25 percent of all U. S. 
 
31 Housing Assistance Council, Taking Stock: Rural People, Poverty, and Housing at the Turn of the 21st 
Century, December 2002, at 9, available at http://ruralhome.org/pubs/hsganalysis/ts2000/index.htm (last 
visited Sept. 3, 2006).   
32 Id. at 20.  According to the 2000 Census, 14.6% of the non-metro population were poor, while the 
poverty rate nationwide was 12.4% and the rate in metro areas was 11.8%.  Id. See also Rural Poverty 
Research Center, Place Matters: Addressing Rural Poverty, 3 (April 2004), available at 
http://www.rprconline.org/synthesis.pdf (last visited Sept.5, 2006). Eighty-four percent of U.S. counties 
with poverty rates above the national average are non-metro.  Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 20.     
33 Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 21-22.  The HAC lists housing problems, low wages (especially 
compared to wages earned by men), and a shortage of adequate child care as some of the factors that 
contribute to the severity of non-metro women’s poverty.  Id. at 21.   
34 Id. at 21-22.  In 1995, 50.8 percent of rural female-headed families with children lived in poverty 
compared to 40.1 percent of their urban counterparts.  Linda K. Cummins, Homelessness Among Rural 
Women, in THE HIDDEN AMERICA: SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN RURAL AMERICA FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY (Robert M. Moore III, ed. 2001) at 63 (citing Housing and Assistance Counsel).    
35 Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 20. 
36 Id. at 19.  See also Struthers & Bokemeier, supra note 12, at 42 (noting that poverty results not only from 
not wanting to work but also from inability to find employment that allows parents to support their 
families); David A. Cotter et al. Gender Inequality in Non-metropolitan and Metropolitan areas, 61 RURAL 
SOCIOLOGY 272, 282 (1996).  But see Georgeanne M. Artz & Peter Orazem, Reexamining Rural Decline: 
How Changing Rural Classifications and Short Time Frames Affect Perceived Growth, Office of Social 
and Economic Trend Analysis, Technical Report 06-014, Iowa State University (January 2005), at 9-10 
(arguing that income and employment growth in rural areas over past thirty years is significantly greater 
than reported by 2000 Census, due to change in Census definition of “rural”). 
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residents.37 Despite the more traditional nature of rural culture, metro and non-metro 
women are employed at equal rates.38 Yet, rural women earn only about half of what 
men in rural areas are paid for similar jobs,39 a ratio close to that between urban women 
and urban men.  Women residing in rural areas are thus at a significant economic 
disadvantage relative to all metro workers, as well as to rural men.    
Changed rural employment opportunities have affected both male and female 
workers in recent decades.  Historically, rural economies were grounded in so-called 
extractive industries, including farming, mining, logging, and fishing.40 Manufacturing 
and service jobs have more recently become staples of rural economies.41 Consumer 
service jobs comprise one-third of non-metro employment.42 In addition, rural people are 
more likely than urban people43 – and rural women more likely than rural men (73 
percent to 39 percent) – to work in manufacturing.44 Both categories of jobs have 
drawbacks.  The former are subject to market whims and overseas relocation, thus 
providing little security.45 While the flexibility of service jobs can accommodate a 
mother’s schedule, it may also mean fewer hours, lower earnings, and poor benefits.46 In 
 
37Taking Stock, supra note 21,at 16.
38 Cotter et al., supra note 36, at 280, 282. 
39 Cummins, supra note 34, at 86 (citing A. Bushy, “Rural Women: Lifestyle and Health Status,” 28 Rural 
Nursing 187-97 (1993)).  Nevertheless, male to female earnings ratios are similar in rural and urban areas.  
Cotter et al., supra note 36, at 280, 282.   
40 Robert M. Gibbs, Rural Labor Markets in an Era of Welfare Reform in RURAL DIMENSIONS OF WELFARE 
REFORM, supra note 9, at  51, 56.  Rural economics are typically not diversified.  The economy of a given 
rural area traditionally concentrates on one means of supporting the community, usually by farming, 
mining, timber, and manufacturing.  ROBERT M. MOORE III, THE HIDDEN AMERICA: SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN 
RURAL AMERICA FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 59 (2001). 
41 See Gibbs, supra note 40, at 56. 
42 Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 19.  This number has risen seven percentage points since 1990.  Id.   
43 In 2000, manufacturing accounted for 18 percent of all jobs in non-metro areas but 14 percent 
nationwide.  Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 18.  Thirteen percent of non-metro women worked in 
manufacturing, compared to 10% of metro women.  Gibbs, supra note 40, at 59.   
44 Gibbs, supra note 40, at 59; Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 19.   
45 Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 18. 
46 Gibbs, supra note 40, at 59.   
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sum, women tend to be employed in “low-wage, unstable, secondary-sector,” gender-
segregated jobs.47 
Rural women frequently rely on elaborate, carefully balanced social networks for 
support and assistance, and to supplement their incomes.48 Rather than turning to social 
service agencies, women often look to each other for help with child care, transportation, 
and even occasionally paying bills.49 In return, they offer the same services to others 
within their networks, either as payment for assistance given or as a down payment, of 
sorts, for a future favor.50 By utilizing a combination of these networks and informal 
work, rural women are sometimes able to avoid welfare and maintain their independence. 
The broad economic picture of rural America is thus disheartening, but the 
situation of women within it is even more so.  In the following sections, I discuss 
transportation, child care, and housing.  These represent structural obstacles that weigh 
very heavily on the rural female population, who have even fewer resources than rural 
men to devote to them.51 
47 Barbara Wells, Women’s Voices: Explaining Poverty and Plenty in a Rural Community, 67 RURAL 
SOCIOLOGY 235, 236 (2002).   
48 FIENE, supra note 28, at 64-66; MARGARET K. NELSON, THE SOCIAL ECONOMY OF SINGLE MOTHERHOOD 
63-92 (2005) (examining the attitudes toward welfare of women who receive it). 
49 Nelson, supra note 48, at 75. 
50 FIENE, supra note 28, at 65; Nelson, supra note 48, at 81.  Women tend to request only as much as they 
are willing to give, knowing they may otherwise be expelled from the network.  Nelson, supra note 48, at 
77.  One woman described the relationship as: “like the checking account—first you put the money in and 
then you make the withdrawal and there’s no problem.  It’s when you do it the other way around [that] 
there’s red ink.”  Id. at 67. 
51 Rural women likely face greater pressure related to housing and other problems than do rural men 
because of the lower earnings of the former.  Wendy Boka, Domestic Violence in Farming Communities: 
Overcoming the Unique Problems Posed by the Rural Setting, 9 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 389, 399 (2004).  The 
extremely high poverty rates among female-headed families in rural areas and the shortage of housing in 
rural areas leave rural women very vulnerable to homelessness.  Id. 
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1.  Transportation.    The long distances that typically separate rural residents 
from jobs, services, and other people make reliable transportation a necessity.52 It is thus 
not surprising that rural Americans spend a higher percentage of their income on 
transportation than do urban ones.53 In light of those expenditures, it is ironic that more 
rural counties than urban ones have a high rate of car-lessness.54 Indeed, while rural 
residents are more reliant upon public transportation than their urban counterparts, they 
have fewer public transport options.55 Indeed, less than a tenth of all federal funding for 
public transportation goes to rural areas,56 and only about 60% of rural counties offer it.57 
Of those using rural public transportation, 62% are women. 58 Such transportation 
 
52 Katherine Porter, Going Broke the Hard Way:  The Economics of Rural Failure, 2005 WISC. L. REV. 969, 
1001.  See also Signe-Mary McKernan, Robert Lerman, Nancy Pindus, & Jesse Valente, Impact of Welfare 
Policy on the Employment of Single Mothers Living in Rural and Urban Areas, in RURAL DIMENSIONS OF 
WELFARE REFORM, supra note 9, at 262.  
53 Porter, supra note 52, at 1008 (citing a Bureau of Labor Statistics report entitled Consumer Expenditures 
in 2001).  In 2001, rural households spent 25% of their income on transportation, whereas urban 
households spent only 19%.  The average transportation expenditure for a rural household exceeded that of 
its urban counterpart by almost $1000 more. Id. 
54 United States Department of Agriculture, Agriculture Information Bulletin Number 795, Rural 
Transportation at a Glance, at 1 (January 2005), available at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/AIB795/AIB795_lowres.pdf  (last visited Sept. 3, 2006) [hereinafter  
Rural Transportation at a Glance].  A high rate of car-lessness is at least twice the average rate of 
carlessness.  Id. According to the USDA, more than 1.6 million rural households have no car.  
Nevertheless, in 2000 rural households had access to a car at a slightly higher rate (92.7%) than urban ones 
(88.9%).  Id. at 3.   
55 See also Porter, supra note 52, at 1026; Susan Murty, Regionalization and Rural Service Delivery 207 in 
THE HIDDEN AMERICA, supra note 34; MOORE, THE HIDDEN AMERICA, supra note 34, at 27.  But see 
USDA, Rural Transportation at a Glance, supra note 54, at 1 (stating that recent increases in federal 
funding and greater state and local control have led to improvements in rural roads and public 
transportation). 
56 Rural Transportation at a Glance, supra note 54, at 3.  In this report the USDA relies on the OMB 
definition of rural.  Id. at 6.  Nevertheless, rural public transportation services grew in the 1990’s.  Non-
metro providers offered 62 percent more passenger trips, 93 percent more miles traveled, and 60 percent 
more vehicles (vans and buses) available.”  Id. at 3. 
57 Id.  at 3.  Twenty-eight percent of these counties offer only limited services, meaning fewer than 25 trips 
per carless household, per year.  Id.   
58 Id. at 4.  Thirty-one percent of users were elderly, and 23 percent were disabled.  Id. Rural residents, 
particularly those in high poverty areas, are more reliant on public transportation than their urban 
counterparts.  Id. at 3.   
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challenges put rural residents at a disadvantage for getting access to employment, health 
care, child care, and other services.59 
2.  Child care.  The nature of rural job markets and the omnipresent issue of 
distance mean that rural residents have fewer child care options than urban ones.60 
Because there are fewer child care centers per capita in rural areas,61 only 25 percent of 
rural children under age five are cared for in such centers, compared to 35 percent 
nationwide.62 For poor rural families, the federally-funded Head Start program may be 
the only tenable center-based child care option,63 but it may not offer all-day programs 
that permit women to work full time. 64 
Seventy-five percent of rural children in child care are in private residences other 
than the child’s home.65 Known as “kith and kin” arrangements,66 these offer the 
 
59 Services are often located in the county seat or some other distant regional location.  See Murty, supra 
note 55, at 204-05. 
60 A lack of child care resources creates an added obstacle for mothers who are trying to find work or leave 
abusive relationships. Wendy Boka, Domestic Violence in Farming Communities: Overcoming the Unique 
Problems Posed by the Rural Setting, 9 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 389, 397 (2004). 
61 Laura J. Colker & Sarah Dewees, Child Care for Welfare Participants in Rural Areas, Rural Welfare 
Issue Brief, Macro International Inc. (November 2000), at 2.  Also, rural child care providers “tend to be 
less educated and trained than their metropolitan counterparts,” resulting in lower quality care.  Id. at 2 
(citing the Rural Policy Research Institute, Rural America and Welfare Reform: An Overview Assessment,
1999, available at http://www.rupri.org/pubs/archive/old/welfare/p99-3).   
62 Colker & Dewees, supra note 61, at 2 (citing Carpizzano et al., Child Care Arrangements for Children 
under Five:  Variation Across States, The Urban Institute, 2000, and Beach, Perspectives on Rural Child 
Care, ERIC Clearinghouse on Rural Education and Small Schools, ERIC Digest, EDO-RC-96-9, 1997).   
63 Colker & Dewees, supra note 61, at 3. Head Start, created under the U.S. Department of Health & 
Human Services, is a child development program serving children up to the age of five.  Head Start 
programs “have the overall goal of increasing the school readiness of young children in low-income 
families.”  To participate, families must meet low-income eligibility.  U.S. Department of Health & Human 
Services, Administration for Children and Families, available at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/hsb/about/index.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2006).   
64 Id. at 3.     
65 Id. at  3-4 (citing Beach, 1997, and Atkinson, “Rural and Urban Families’ Use of Child Care,” in 43 
Family Relations 16-22 (1994)).  Nationally, 15 percent of preschool children are cared for in the homes of 
licensed child care providers.  Id. (citing Casper, “Who’s Minding Our Preschoolers?” in Current 
Population Reports Household Economic Studies, P70-62, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1997). 
66 “Kith” are friends and neighbors and “kin” are relatives.  Id.   One study found that rural residents are 
twice as likely as urban dwellers to use kith and kin arrangements.  Low-income families are 50 percent 
more likely to use it than their wealthier counterparts.  Colker & Dewees, supra note 61, at 4 (citing Beach, 
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advantages of flexibility67 and low cost, and may feature informal payment schemes.68 
The quality of care is inconsistent, however, and may prove unreliable.69 
Finding adequate, quality child care is thus a great challenge for rural parents who 
work outside the home.  This burden surely falls more heavily on women because they 
are even more likely than their urban counterparts to be responsible for child care, given 
the traditional views of rural communities. As a consequence, rural women often work 
part-time or engage in informal employment activities so that they can care for their 
young children. 70 
3.  Housing.  While the past several decades have seen many improvements in 
rural housing,71 almost 30 percent of non-metro residents still face housing problems,72 
the most common being affordability.73 About 5.5 million rural households pay in excess 
of 30 percent of their monthly income for housing.74 Worse yet, housing costs consume 
more than half of the incomes for another 2.4 million.75 Housing quality presents another 
challenge in non-metro areas, where 1.6 million units are moderately or severely 
 
1997, Atkinson, 1994); Collins & Carlson, Child Care by Kith and Kin:  Supporting Family, Friends, and 
Neighbors Caring for Children, National Center for Children in Poverty, Columbia University, 1998). 
67 This flexibility includes options for drop-in child care and extended hours.  Id. at 3. 
68 These may include bartering, or trading services, but most are on a fee-paying basis.  Id. at 4.   
69 Id. at 3-4.  Local regulations governing licensure in rural areas are typically not as stringent as 
metropolitan ones.    Id. at 3 (citing Beach, 1997).   
70 See e.g., Struthers & Bokemeier, supra note 12 at 25 (stating that rural women believe parenting is “their 
most important job” and that household work is often based on “a gendered division of labor”); Tickamyer, 
supra note 4, at 738 (noting that “women with young children are more likely to engage in productive 
(economic) activities close to their reproductive (childrearing and household) responsibilities).  But see 
Katherine MacTavish and Sonya Salamon, What do Rural Families Look Like Today? in CHALLENGES FOR 
RURAL AMERICA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 77 (pointing out that many older rural children “may 
find themselves in latchkey situations” due to parental employment outside the community). 
71 Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 24.   
72 Id. at 31.  “Over 6.2 million non-metro households have at least one major problem … [and about] 
662,000 rural households have two or more housing problems.”  Id.. “Problems” include affordability 
issues, substandard quality, and crowding.  Id.
73 Id. at 31. 
74 Id. at 28.   
75 Id. at 28. 
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substandard.76 As one example, while rural homes comprise only one-fifth of the 
nation’s total housing units they account for over 30 percent of houses with inadequate 
plumbing.77 
Sixty-eight percent of the nation’s households are owner-occupied, an all-time 
high in home ownership.78 While non-metro residents enjoy an even higher rate of 
homeownership, at 76 percent,79 this does not necessarily indicate greater wealth, well-
being or stability.80 The higher rate of rural home ownership is due in part to 
manufactured homes, which are twice as common in non-metro areas as they are 
nationwide.81 But manufactured homes are not as beneficial to consumers as 
conventional single-family homes because the former tend to depreciate in value82 and 
are financed with higher-rate, personal property loans.83 Rural housing assets also tend to 
 
76 Id. at 30.  This represents 6.9 percent of non-metro units.  Additionally, people of color in non-metro 
areas are almost three times more likely to live in substandard housing than their white counterparts.  Id. 
77 Id. at 30.   
78 Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 24-25. 
79 Id. at 25.   
80 The national median value of a home is $120,000, while that of a non-metro home is $80,000.  Taking 
Stock, supra note 21, at 32. 
81 Id. at 24.  Although non-metro areas have less than a quarter of the nation’s housing units, these areas 
have over half of manufactured homes.  Id. at 27.  While the quality of manufactured homes has improved 
in recent years, more than a third of non-metro mobile home residents live in units at least 20 years old.  Id. 
at 26.  Manufactured housing is the fastest growing segment of rural housing stock, accounting for 38 
percent of homes built between 1996 and 2001.  Ezra Rosser, Rural Housing and Code Enforcement: 
Navigating Between Values and Housing Types, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POLICY, at 18 (2006) (citing 
2001 National Housing Survey). 
82 Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 26, 32.  Manufactured homes depreciate at a rate of 1.5 percent annually 
compared to an annual appreciation rate of 4.5 percent for conventionally constructed single-family homes.  
Further, manufactured homes in rural areas appreciate less than those in urban settings.  Id.  This is 
particularly troubling considering that a “home is the most valuable asset most Americans will ever own.”  
Id at 32.  The median purchase price of a new manufactured home in non-metro areas is approximately 
$41,000, compared to $130,000 for a new single-family home.  Id. at 26. 
83 Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 26, 32.  One factor is the type of financing used to purchase manufactured 
homes.  Most new manufactured homes are financed with personal property loans.  Id. This type of loan is 
less beneficial for the consumer than conventional housing loans because of higher interest rates and 
shorter terms. Id. at 26.  About one-tenth of non-metro owners with a mortgage pay an interest rate of 10 
percent or more.  This is nearly double the proportion of metro owners who pay such high rates.  Id. at 32.   
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be less liquid because rural home owners are often tied to their specific location.84 
Finally, recent shifts in emphasis by federal housing programs have reduced the amount 
of assistance available to the significant number of rural households that rely upon it.85 
C.  Conclusion     
 Rural America, then, is an economically depressed place that offers few 
opportunities to enhance human capital.  The people who reside there are faced with 
particular structural obstacles, often related to the physical distances that separate them 
from services.  While gender specific data were not available for each of these, it is 
reasonable to surmise that because rural women earn substantially less than rural men, 
they are less likely to own a vehicle or to be in a stable housing situation.  Rural women 
are, in fact, one of the poorest groups of people in the United States.   
 The social and political portrait of rural America also lends insights into 
expectations of the women who live there.  Rural residents tend to hold more 
conservative political views, and their expectations of women’s roles tend to be more 
traditional and more rigid.  These factors, like economic and structural ones, severely 
limit women’s opportunities, as well as their day-to-day choices.     
II:  A Role for Place in Feminist Theory   
 At least two strands of feminist thought accommodate or facilitate theorizing 
about rural women and what distinguishes their situation from those of other groups of 
 
84 Rosser, supra note 81, at 14.  Farmers often make their living from the land on which their homes are 
located, and non-farmers “are limited by the fact that these small towns cannot support a commercial rental 
market except on a very small scale.”  Id. 
85 Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 34.  Federal assistance is crucial for many households, as indicated by a 
USDA Economic Research Service study that found that ninety percent of rural borrowers would probably 
not have been able to afford their homes without federal assistance.  Id. at 33.  The shifts have been to 
indirect subsidies such as loan guarantees and tax incentives.  However, only 3 percent of guaranteed loans, 
as opposed to 44 percent of the program’s direct loans, served very low-income households in FY 2003.  
Id. at 34.   
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women.  Radical feminism’s focus on power disparities is useful for conceptualizing how 
rural women’s differences not only from men, but also from urban women, operate to 
their disadvantage.  Anti-essentialism scholarship acknowledges the complexity of each 
woman’s identity and circumstances.  Such multiple perspectives thinking can and should 
also attend to the role of place in women’s lives.86 
Radical feminist Catharine MacKinnon’s work centers on the experiences of 
women and the operation of power in society.87 She asserts that “[w]omen have 
systematically been subjected to physical insecurity; targeted for sexual denigration and 
violation; depersonalized and denigrated; deprived of respect, credibility and resources; 
and silenced – and denied public presence, voice and representation of their interests.”88 
For rural women, these deprivations and denials, as well as the vulnerability and 
hardship they beget, are often aggravated by their geographical circumstances.89 Their 
low socioeconomic status aggravates their physical insecurity and denies them credibility 
and resources.  So do the practical challenges they face in accessing child care, 
educational opportunity, good jobs and even government assistance.  Rural women’s 
physical distance from those who can assist or rescue them aggravates their vulnerability 
to physical violence by intimates and others.90 Further, in their more traditional 
communities, rural women are more definitively relegated to the private sphere of hearth 
 
86 See generally Tickamyer, supra note 4 (arguing for greater attention to spatial issues in research and 
theorizing about women and poverty).   
87Catharine A. MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 CHI-KENT L. REV. 687 (2000).   
88 See, e.g., MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY OF  THE STATE, supra note 10, at 160.   
89 Of course, many others have criticized MacKinnon for focusing solely on the role of gender in these 
social hierarchies while overlooking other markers of identity.  See, e.g., Harris, supra note 7 (arguing that 
MacKinnon and Robin West had inadequately accounted for race, placing white women at the center of 
their work); Pat Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence:  Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 191 
(1989-90) (arguing that MacKinnon and West had excluded the lesbian experience from their theorizing).    
90 See generally Boka, supra note 60. 
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and home.  Their only “public” presence, typically, is in low-wage, dead-end 
employment.   
 In a similar vein, radical feminist Judith Baer advocates what she calls situation 
jurisprudence, arguing that feminist legal theory must “develop analyses that will 
separate situations from the people experiencing them.”91 She asserts that failure “to 
discuss what has been done to women . . . leave[s] out a huge part of reality.”92 Baer 
distinguishes between situation jurisprudence and what she calls character jurisprudence, 
which focuses on the nature or character of women.93 Situation jurisprudence, on the 
other hand, disputes liberalism’s presumption of autonomy because our sexist society 
denies it to women.94 
In support of her argument against this presumption of autonomy and her focus on 
women’s situation, Baer calls attention not only to women’s vulnerability, but also to the 
responsibility and duty they bear, particularly in relation to care-giving.  She 
acknowledges that MacKinnon “captures the objectification, the danger, and the 
vulnerability” of being a women, but argues that MacKinnon overlooks or discounts the 
work, the demands, and the domestic burdens heaped on women.95 Of women’s duty, 
 
91 BAER, supra note 1, at 68.   
92 Id. at 62.   
93 Id. at 40-67.  Baer writes: 
Critiques of situation jurisprudence fall into the same trap as character jurisprudence:  
they let men and institutions off the hook while focusing women’s attention on 
themselves.  Whereas character jurisprudence threatens to trap women in gender-role 
expectations, critical reaction to situation jurisprudence threatens to frustrate gender-role 
expectations, critical reaction to situation jurisprudence threatens to frustrate gender-role 
change.  Character theory has produced an ethic of burden and obligation; situation has 
theory has been read as an insult to women. 
Id. at 62.  
94 BAER, supra note 1, at 55.  Baer notes that a rights conceptualization as problematic because “they 
isolate individuals in theory when they are not independent of one another in reality.”  Id. (quoting Wendy 
Brown, Reproductive Freedom and the Right to Privacy: A Paradox for Feminists, in FAMILIES, POLITICS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 331 (Irene Diamond, ed. 1983)).   
95 Id. at 57.  
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Baer writes:  “It’s not only the lying down that oppresses, but the jumping up:  the 
expectation that one is available to meet others’ needs is a crucial component of the 
women’s situation.”96 This, too, is part of gendered power.   
 Baer discusses another way in which law (and scholars of character jurisprudence, 
in particular) uses the theme of responsibility against women:  the “popular idea” that 
people are responsible for their own trouble.  She notes the specific examples of blaming 
victims of domestic violence and poverty for bringing those problems onto themselves.97 
Baer refutes the accuracy of these claims, suggesting that holding victims responsible for 
their problems is a “useful conservative tool.”98 She notes that it is easier to oppose 
policies that might reduce poverty and abuse if individuals are held responsible.99 Taking 
battered women as an example, Baer writes that “the abuse belongs to her, not to the 
abuser or the society in which the abuse occurs.  The term ‘battered woman’ itself 
incorporates this premise; society defines the problem in terms of victims, not in terms of 
violent husbands and lovers.”100 
Baer’s attention to women’s situation in all of its complexity can obviously serve 
the interests of rural women, who are literally situated in physical isolation from each 
other, as well as from services, educational and economic opportunity, and more.  Both 
aspects of “responsibility” that Baer discusses are also highly relevant to rural women.  
While women tend to bear greater responsibility for child and other dependent care than 
 
96 Id. at 57-58. 
97 Id. at 63.   
98 Id. at 65.   
99 Id.   
100 Id. at 66.  Baer asserts that the battered woman’s situation “may not be her fault in the sense of 
causation, but it is her fault in the sense of being her misfortune.”  Id. The phenomenon Baer describes is 
illustrated in the judicial opinion of Swails v. State, discussed infra notes 115-116 and accompanying text, 
where the court uses the passive voice in writing that “Connie Landers was beaten by her boyfriend, Kevin 
Swails.”   
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do their male partners, 101 rural women appear even more burdened than their urban 
counterparts, due in large part to the more rigid and traditional gender role expectations 
of rural communities.  The poor educational and employment opportunities available to 
rural women, coupled with the dearth of quality child care, further constrain those who 
seek employment outside the home in lieu of – or in addition to – fulfilling these 
traditional roles.102 
As for the phenomenon of viewing women as responsible for their own woes, it is 
evident, too, in law’s responses to rural women.  Law too often fails to appreciate the 
strength of the structural barriers that constrain rural women’s choices, instead blaming 
them for their unfortunate circumstances and consequences.  I return to a discussion of 
this phenomenon below in relation to judicial adjudication of parental rights and domestic 
violence questions.103 Judicial assumptions of individual responsibility – for both the 
consequences of having sex and of living in an inconvenient place – also loom large in 
the abortion context.104 
Next, my analysis draws on anti-essentialist scholarship to argue for inclusion of 
the critical context that place – and the rural milieu in particular – can represent in both 
theorizing women’s subordination and responding to it.  Anti-essentialists have long 
maintained that gender is not the sole basis of women’s disempowerment.  As scholars 
have drawn attention to the intersection of gender and race, or gender and sexual 
 
101 See, e.g., JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER (2000); see also W. Jean Yeung et al., Children’s Time 
With Fathers in Intact Families, 63 J. OF MARRIAGE AND FAMILY 136, 148 (2001) (looking at the amount 
of time fathers spend with their children and finding, based on analyses collected in 1997, that “the relative 
time fathers in intact families were directly engaged with children was 67% that of mothers’ on weekdays 
and 87% that of mothers’ on weekends”); Tickamyer, supra note 4, at 725 (referring to agreement among 
feminists that women’s disproportionate responsibility for reproductive labor and care-giving contribute to 
high poverty among women).     
102 See supra notes [   ] and accompanying text (discussing the employment patterns of rural women).   
103 See infra Parts III (a) and (b). 
104 See infra Part III (c).  
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orientation (among others), I assert the need for attention to the intersection of gender and 
place.  I maintain that a rural setting is legally relevant to more issues than the law 
currently acknowledges and that it is relevant, in particular, to many women-specific 
issues.   
In her landmark 1990 article on anti-essentialism, Angela Harris explained that 
gender essentialism was dangerous because “experiences of women perceived as 
different are ignored or treated as variations on the (white) norm.”105 In the rare cases 
when law has seen and engaged rural women, recognizing them in relation to place, it has 
viewed these women simply as variations on an urban norm.  Frequently, however, law 
has not seen or identified rural women as such; rather, it has looked right past their rural 
circumstances.  This phenomenon is reflected by rural scholars who have remarked, 
“[w]e are an urban society now, one that is pretty sure we know what ‘urban’ is, but not 
at all sure we know what ‘rural’ is.”106 
Just as Sylvia Law defined “heterosexism” as the “pervasive cultural presumption 
and prescription of heterosexual relationship,”107 I query whether law functions under a 
pervasive cultural presumption of urbanism.  But place – like race, sexual orientation, and 
class – is inextricably linked to the experiences of rural women as they encounter law.  
To illustrate this, I introduce here some of the stories of rural women, as reflected in 
judicial narratives, putting them in context and bringing them into the broader 
conversation about women and law.108 
105 Harris, supra note 7, at 615. 
106 Elizabeth Beeson & Marty Strange, Why Rural Matters:  The Need for Every State to Take Action on 
Rural Education (Aug. 2000), at http://www.ruraledu.org/streport/summary.html.
107 Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187, 195.   
108 See Harris, supra note 7, at 585 (writing that she introduces the voices of black women to destabilize 
and subvert the unity of MacKinnon’s and West’s “woman”).   
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III:  Rural Women in the Presence of Law 
 I discuss in this Part judicial (in)attention to the realities of rural women in the 
contexts of domestic violence, termination of parental rights, and abortion.  The first two 
of these are somewhat similar in that the relevant legal doctrines accommodate a multi-
factor, contextual analysis that ultimately assesses the appropriateness of a woman’s 
actions.  That is, adjudication of domestic violence cases usually involves passing 
judgment on whether a woman was justified in defending herself or whether she acted 
under duress in responding to intimate abuse.  Decisions to terminate parental rights are 
also multi-faceted, involving a comprehensive assessment of a parent’s behavior.   
 The legal inquiry regarding abortion is somewhat narrower:  What constitutes an 
undue burden on a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy?  While applying this test 
theoretically involves a fact-intensive analysis of the consequences of the regulation in 
question, courts have been very miserly about deeming regulations to constitute undue 
burdens, even in the face of highly compelling factual records.  In several cases, the U. S. 
Supreme Court and other federal courts have disregarded the structural realities of rural 
women’s lives which, in combination with abortion regulations, prevent those women 
from exercising their right to an abortion.     
 A.  Domestic Violence.   
Bring sanity to bear on the notion that a woman victimized by a physically 
abusive man must go to an outdoor toilet for refuge and cannot seek that 
refuge in her [car] where the doors lock and the victim has mobility to 
further escape if necessary.   
 
-Cynthia Hage,  
Victim of domestic violence charged with DUI 
State v. Hage (Minn. 1999) 
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Intimate abuse is part of the factual background in many legal contexts, including 
those that adjudicate the assault, battery, or death of a battered woman or her abusive 
partner.  Whether a woman’s behavior was appropriate or reasonable may become an 
issue, for example, if she harms or kills her assailant.  A woman’s perception of the threat 
to her, as well as her firmness in the face of that threat, may become issues if she 
acquiesces to become her abuser’s partner in crime.  Lenore Walker, who coined the term 
“battered women’s syndrome,” brought to light the complexity of an abused woman’s 
psychological condition.109 Like Walker, many have criticized law’s unease with or 
incapacity to accommodate appropriately the battered woman scenario.110 Some calling 
for reform have proposed the substitution of a reasonable woman111 or a reasonable 
battered woman112 standard.  Others have called for a move away from the imminence 
standard, endorsing instead a jury determination of when deadly force is necessary.113 
In this section, I consider how a woman living in a rural area, or merely present in 
one, may experience aggravated vulnerability based on spatial isolation from others, in 
particular from sources of aid.  I look in detail at several cases in which a woman in a 
rural area claimed that she responded under duress to intimate abuse.  The decisions in 
 
109 See, e.g.,LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984); LENORE E. WALKER,
TERRIFYING LOVE, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF DEFENSE AS LEGAL 
JUSTIFICATION 23-40 (1987) (arguing that the behavior of battered women who kill needs to be understood 
as normal, not crazy); see also ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED W OMEN KILL 127-30 (1987) 
(identifying some predictive factors for when women kill their abusers).   
110 See, e.g., Walter Steele & Christine Sigman, Reexamining the Doctrine of Self Defense to Accommodate 
Battered Women, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 169, 175-76 (1991); Laura Reece, Women’s Defense to Criminal 
Homicide and the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Need for Relocation of Difference, 1 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 53, 55 (1991); Stephen J. Schulfhoer, The Gender Questions in Criminal Law, 7 SOC. PHIL.
& POL’Y 105, 127 (1990); CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN, SELF 
DEFENSE, AND THE LAW (1989). 
111 See Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self Defense, 8
Harv. Women’s L.J., 121, 152 (1985).  
112 See Kit Kinports, Comment, Defending Battered Women’s Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. L. REV. 393, 
416 (1988).   
113 See Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C.L. 
REV. 371 (1993).   
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these cases reflect a lack of understanding of the quandary faced by victims of such 
crimes, particularly when their dilemma is heightened by physical distance from those 
who could render assistance.114 
In Swails v. State,115 the Texas Court of Appeals upheld a trial court’s refusal to 
instruct the jury regarding the defense of duress to murder. The refused instruction came 
in the face of the female defendant’s argument that she had been terrorized by her 
boyfriend, who initiated the murder plan.  The majority opinion in the case recited these 
facts: 
 
114 A rural setting is sometimes relevant to the outcome of a domestic violence case for reasons other 
than enhanced vulnerability.  Specifically, low population density sometimes often fosters lack of 
anonymity among those in a rural community, and that familiarity may be legally relevant.  See generally 
Boka, supra note [    ].  A 2004 decision of the Connecticut Superior Court is a good example of a court’s 
understanding the lack of anonymity that marks rural communities and applying the law in light of that 
reality.  The court held that the estate of a woman murdered by her ex-boyfriend could sue in negligence 
the small municipality in which she lived for failing to protect her.  Florence v. Town of Plainfield, 48 
Conn. Supp. 440, 849 A.2d 7 (2004).  The decedent had repeatedly sought protection from police, who 
failed for several weeks to execute an arrest warrant against the former boyfriend.  Indeed, the trial court 
found it “hard to imagine what more a desperate woman could do to reach out for police protection . . . 
and to construct a situation of such delay and failure of police to appreciate the gravity of the situation 
and act accordingly.”  Id. at 453, 849 A.2d at 21.   The court suggested that because the parties lived in a 
small town, the police department would be expected to have working knowledge of such ongoing 
situations, making its failure to act even more inexcusable.  The court wrote that the police department in 
this rural area knew or should have known of the defendant and “his antisocial and criminal propensities 
by reputation if not by personal contact.” Id. at 444, 849 A.2d at 10.  Somewhat offensive was the court’s 
effort to distinguish the case at hand from other domestic violence situations, the significance of which it 
dismissed.  The court wrote:   
[T]his was not simply one of those, regrettably routine, calls for domestic violence 
assistance.  Situations are presented to police departments daily where two ordinarily 
law-abiding citizens may be involved in an intrafamilial disturbance marked by 
threats or scuffling brought on my momentary anger or intoxication.  There are many 
levels of complaints which require judgment and discretion on the part of the police 
officers engaged in the stressful daily pursuit of their duties.  This was not an 
ordinary case of domestic violence.   
Id. at 451, 849 A.2d at 14. 
The South Carolina Supreme Court reached the contrary conclusion in a somewhat similar case.  
In Arthurs v. Aiken County, the court held the sheriffs department not liable for failure to protect Deborah 
Munn from her husband, who threatened her and her family three times on the day he killed her.  Munn 
declined sheriff deputies’ suggestions that she go to a safe house.  346 S.C. 97, 551 S.E.2d 579 (2001).  
The court noted that because the husband was not present at the scene when the deputies responded, he 
was not subject to immediate arrest.  The court concluded that the officers neither owed nor breached a 
duty to Munn.  Id. at 107, 551 S.E.2d at 584.  
115 986 S.W.2d 41 (Texas App. 1999).   
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One evening in 1994, Connie Landers was beaten by her 
boyfriend, Kevin Swails, because she had no money to give him.  Later 
the couple went driving.  During the drive, Kevin told Connie they were 
going to rob and kill an old man because Kevin wanted his money and 
guns.  After this conversation, the couple drove to Waldo Blanke’s house 
and parked their car in front of his door.  While Connie sat in the car, 
Kevin knocked on the door.  Blanke answered, and Connie heard Kevin 
telling Blanke “we’re going to play a game old man” and then saw Kevin 
shock Blanke with a 2000 volt stun gun and begin pushing and hitting him 
repeatedly.  Connie, still in the car, heard Blanke saying “oh God, Kevin, 
oh God.”   
 
At first, when Kevin yelled at her to come inside, Connie did 
nothing.  But then Kevin yelled that he would kill her if she did not come 
inside.  Connie walked inside and, when Kevin told her to get something 
with which to strangle Blanke, she gave him a radio she found on a nearby 
table.  As Connie watched, Kevin hit Blanke in the head with the radio, 
pushed him onto the couch, and fell with him onto the floor.  Connie then 
saw Kevin put the radio cord around Blanke’s neck and pull on one end of 
the cord.   Connie held the other end with her knee.116 
Kevin and Connie then took Blanke’s guns, jewelry and money to their car.  They 
married several days later.117 
Connie asserted the defense of duress in response to the State’s capital murder 
charges.  She argued that Kevin presented a threat of death or serious bodily injury to her 
and that he had previously threatened, stalked, and physically assaulted her.  Expert 
testimony supported her argument that a person of reasonable firmness might not have 
been able to resist Kevin’s efforts to force her participation in the crimes.  The trial court 
nevertheless rejected Connie’s request for jury instructions regarding duress, and the jury 
found her guilty of capital murder.118 
116 Id. at 42.   
117 Id.  
118 Id. at 43.  
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The Texas Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision not to instruct 
the jury regarding duress because the defense “was not raised by the evidence.”119 The 
court explained that a “defendant is ‘compelled’ to engage in proscribed conduct ‘only 
if the force or threat of force would render a person of reasonable firmness incapable of 
resisting the pressure.’”120 Further, “the threatened death or serious bodily injury is 
‘imminent’ only if it will occur in the present, not in the future.”121 Finally, the court 
explained, for duress to apply, the defendant must not have “intentionally, knowingly, 
or recklessly [placed herself] in a situation in which it was probable that [s]he would be 
subjected to compulsion.”122 
The court did not see Kevin’s threats to kill Connie as evidence that she was 
“compelled to enter the house by a threat of imminent death or serious bodily 
injury.”123 It noted that, to the contrary, Connie knew of Kevin’s intent to rob and kill 
Blanke, and she knew that he entered the house with “only a stun gun,” an apparent 
reference to the fact he was not a serious threat to her.  The court observed that Connie 
“sat alone in the car ––outside the reach of Kevin,” for “some period of time,”124 
suggesting that she should have taken “this opportunity to leave the scene.”125 Because 
she instead entered the house,126 the court found that if “Kevin’s threat is construed to 
mean he would hunt Swails down and kill her if she did not go inside Blanke’s house, it 
was a threat of future, not imminent, harm.”127 
119 Id. at 45.   
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 45-46 (citing Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §8.05(d)).  
123 Id. at 46 (double emphasis original). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id..
127 Id. 
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It was dissenting Judge Alma L. López who pointed out the relevance of the 
rural setting to the determination of whether sufficient evidence supported Connie’s 
argument of duress.  After reciting the history between Connie and Kevin, Judge López 
noted that “Kevin yelled, screamed and terrorized Connie and told her he would kill 
her, too” as they drove away from the murder scene.128 She noted that Connie had 
“visibly observed Kevin killing the victim” and that he had threatened her, too, if she 
did not assist him.  Judge López thus concluded it was “logical” that “Connie felt 
threatened and compelled to help Kevin or risk losing her life.”129 He had, after all, 
killed Blanke while armed only with a stun gun.  She took issue with the majority’s 
implication that Connie was “necessarily free to leave the scene during the murder,” 
arguing that no evidence supported this assumption.  In doing so, Judge López revealed 
some facts that the majority had omitted.     
The scene of the murder is located in rural Bandera County.  
Although the photographic exhibits suggest other lake homes in close 
proximity to the Blanke home, there is no testimony that any of these 
homes were occupied at the time of the offense so as to serve as an 
immediate source of aid or sanctuary.130 
Noting that the car they had driven was parked “next to the front door, just a few steps 
from where Kevin was yelling his threats of violence to Connie,” Judge López also 
commented on the lack of evidence as to who controlled the car keys.  She concluded:  
“Would a person of reasonable firmness, who had suffered three beatings that very day 
from him, have considered Kevin’s threats and commands to present only future danger 
to her under these circumstances?  I think not.”131 
128 Id. at 47-48 (Lopez, J., dissenting).  
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
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Judge López thus picks up on the enhanced vulnerability that women may 
experience when threatened in rural areas.  Because they are physically removed from 
others who might rescue them or render assistance, these women are at even greater risk 
than those who are otherwise similarly situated.  The majority’s assumption that Connie 
was not under duress as a result of Kevin’s threats depends, in part, upon her ability to 
escape to a place where he could not reach her.  Yet Judge López disputes the majority’s 
inference that because Kevin carried “only a stun gun,” he did not present an imminent 
threat to Connie so long as she was not within arms’ reach.  While the majority appears to 
assume that Connie could outrun Kevin and make her way to a safe place with even 20-
yards’ head start, Judge López is doubtful that Connie could escape Kevin and that a safe 
place existed.  She notes the rural locale in support of her conclusion that the jury should 
have been permitted to determine whether Kevin was an imminent threat to Connie, and 
not merely a future one.   
While scholars have argued for a legal standard other than imminence in cases 
of intimate abuse, Professor Holly Maguigan’s research indicates that the real problem 
in cases where battered women kill is not existing law.132 The legal standard of 
imminence is less the problem, she concludes, than judges’ interpretation of the law in 
ways that do not permit the question to get to the jury.  The Texas courts’ handling of 
Swails supports Maguigan’s argument.    
 
132 See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self Defense:  Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform 
Proposals, 140 Pa. L. Rev. 370, 382-87, 457-58 (1991) (arguing that the real problem in cases where 
battered women kill is not existing law, but judges’ interpreting the law in such a way that self-defense 
instructions rarely get to the jury).       
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In State v. Hage, 133 a jury did get the opportunity to consider the reasonableness 
of a battered woman’s actions.  The jury found she was not under duress when she used 
her car as refuge from her abusive boyfriend.  The Minnesota Supreme Court, on 
appeal in this 1999 decision, showed no more empathy for her plight, upholding her 
conviction for being in physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol.   
On the day in question, Cynthia Hage’s boyfriend became violent with her after 
they argued.  He had been physically abusive to her in the past, and on this occasion he 
slammed her hand into a table with force sufficient to draw blood.  She left their trailer 
home and took refuge in her car.134 A law enforcement officer responded to a report 
from Cynthia’s boyfriend that she was drunk and sitting in her car.  The officer, who 
had responded to a domestic disturbance call there in the past month,135 found Cynthia 
sitting in the driver’s seat.  The car was not running, but the keys were in the ignition.  
Whether Cynthia had driven the car from their home to the county road or whether it 
had been parked there all day was disputed.136 Both field sobriety and breathalyzer 
tests confirmed Cynthia’s intoxication, and she was charged with driving under the 
influence of alcohol.137 
The court denied Cynthia’s request for an instruction on “self defense/retreat” 
and instead instructed the jury on the defense of necessity.138 Specifically, it instructed 
 
133 595 N.W.2d 200 (Minn. 1999)  
134 Id. at 202.   
135 Id. at 203.   
136 Id. at 202.  Because of record flooding in the area at the time, the property on which they and some of 
their neighbors lived was isolated from the surrounding area by flood waters for 31 days.  Although a 
gravel driveway led from County Road 93 to their home, some evidence indicated that it was not passable 
on the day in question.  Id. 
137 Id. at 203.  
138 Id. at 203.   
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the jury that Hage bore the burden of proof to show that her actions were necessary 
because of an emergency situation “where the peril is instant, overwhelming and leaves 
no alternative but the conduct in question.”139 After the jury found Cynthia guilty, she 
moved for a judgment of acquittal on the basis that the jury had failed to consider 
adequately her emergency circumstances.  She argued specifically “that the court bring 
sanity to bear on the notion that a woman victimized by a physically abusive man must 
go to an outdoor toilet for refuge and cannot seek that refuge in her [car] where the 
doors lock and the victim has mobility to further escape if necessary.”140 The trial court 
denied her motion.  It noted that “other options were available to Hage besides seeking 
refuge” in the driver’s seat of her car,141 but it did not specify what these options were.  
The issue on appeal was whether the jury had been properly instructed, and the 
Minnesota Supreme Court found no error.     
It is difficult to squabble with a jury determination on an instruction such as the 
one given in Hage. The argument can be made, of course, that as a matter of policy, 
the burden of proof that Cynthia was not facing an emergency should lie with the state.  
But the real lesson from cases like Hage may be one for defense lawyers.  Perhaps 
Cynthia’s plea on her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, had it been 
made to the jury in closing argument, would have resulted in a different outcome.  The 
jury might have empathized if focused more upon the predicament Cynthia faced that 
day:  remain in the trailer with an abusive man, hide in an outhouse, or sit in a car with 
locking doors.  It is thus imperative that defense lawyers present these situations to 
juries in all relevant detail, playing the “rural card,” if you will.   
 
139 Id. at 203-04.   
140 Id. at 204.   
141 Id. at 204.   
- 31 -
Insensitivity to the peril of the female defendant in opinions such as Swails and 
Hage is ironic in light of judicial recognition elsewhere of the added vulnerability – even 
helplessness – associated with rural places.142 Judicial narratives in criminal cases, for 
example, often suggest the greater susceptibility of rural residents to crime, a 
vulnerability stemming from their physical distance from those who could thwart a 
criminal act or render assistance in its wake.143 In a 1979 decision, for example, the 
Alaska Supreme Court upheld the maximum sentence for an escapee who fled to a 
remote fishing camp where he committed several thefts and broke into some 
smokehouses.  The court based its decision on the vulnerability of rural residents, even 
though the defendant injured no one there.144 By way of explanation, the court wrote that 
the residents “don't have the assurance that people in the more developed areas and 
communities might have that they can secure some protection by picking up the phone 
and calling a police officer from a nearby police station who can quickly get over to that 
area in a car.  People are simply much more on their own and simply don't have that kind 
of security.”145 Thus, the court concluded, the escapee’s actions “must be considered as a 
very serious offense against the public.”146 
As a related matter, judicial narratives often note that the defendant took his 
 
142 Courts sometimes expressly recognize that rural residents’ isolation exposes them to other perils, too.  In 
a 1987 Mississippi case, for example, the court repeatedly noted the vulnerability of an elderly, rural 
woman whose phone service was wrongfully disconnected.  South Central Bell v. Epps, 509 So. 2d 886 
(Miss. 1987).  The court suggested that the phone company’s injury to her was aggravated because she was 
such a vulnerable customer, and their wrongdoing left her unserved, without the lifeline she needed.  Id. at 
893-94.   
143 See, e.g., Idaho v. Olson, 806 P.2d 963, 964 (Idaho 1991) (alleged shooting occurred on “a rural 
mountain road in Latah County”); McElmurry v. State, 60 P.3d 4 (Okla. 2002) (defendant approached 
victim’s rural house through the woods in order not to be seen); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) 
(defendant “entered the rural home of a 65-year-old widow” while she slept and raped her); Stein v. New 
York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953) (robbery and murder occurred on “lonely country roads”).   
144 One v. Alaska, 592 P.2d 1193 (Alaska 1979). 
145 Id. at 1194.   
146 Id. at 1195.   
- 32 -
victim to a rural area, suggesting he could thereby evade detection.147 Indeed, the 
vulnerable position in which some victims are put when taken to rural areas leads to 
conviction of a more serious offense.  In a 2002 Texas case, the defendants kidnapped, 
sexually assaulted, and then released their victim in a rural area.148 They argued on 
appeal that they should not have been convicted of aggravated kidnapping, but rather of a 
lesser offense, because they had released the victim in a “safe place.”149 The appellate 
court agreed with the trial judge that the victim had not been released in a safe place, 
noting testimony that the place was “in the country,” “mainly fields and that sort of 
thing” with a few trailer houses and a bait shop.150 
Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court found sufficient the jury instructions in a 1977 
case in which the defendants kidnapped and robbed their victim before abandoning him, 
without his trousers, boots, coat or glasses, “on an unlighted, rural road.”151 In poor 
visibility from blowing snow, and a temperature near zero,152 the victim was struck and 
killed by a speeding pick-up truck 20 minutes later.  The defendant argued that he could 
 
147 See, e.g., Lingar v. Bowersox, 176 F.3d 453 (8th Cir. 1998) (defendant drove young male victim to rural 
area, ordered him to disrobe and masturbate before shooting him); Ponder v. State, 713 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. 
1986) (defendant kidnapped female law enforcement officer and drove her into a rural area where he 
repeatedly sexually assaulted her under a bridge, leaving her handcuffed there); State v. Fosnow, 240 
Wis.2d 699, 624 N.W.2d 883 (Wis. App. 2d 2000) (defendant kidnapped woman, took her to a “home in 
rural Crawford County” where he sexually assaulted her); Pilkinton v. State, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 2879 
(defendant “drove back roads” while beating his girlfriend for 10 hours); Anderson v. Hopkins, 113 F.3d 
825 (8th Cir. 1997) (victim tricked into going to a rural place where he was then killed); Fitzgerald v. 
Greene, 150 F.3d 357 (4th Cir. 1998) (defendant took 13-year-old girl to rural area where he raped her).                     
148 Sherell v. Wray, Nos. 03-01-00625-CR, 03-01-00627-CR, 03-01-00628-CR, 2002 WL 31525288 (Tex. 
App. Nov. 15, 2002).
149 Id. at *2 (citing Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §  20.04(d) (West Supp.2002)).   
150 Id. at *3.   The court continued:   
CP had been sexually assaulted by two strangers, and the examining nurse later found 
thirty-six areas of acute physical trauma to her body.  CP was clothed but barefoot, was 
still under the influence of alcohol, and did not know where she was.  She was afraid that 
her assailants, who she believed were armed, would return.  It was before dawn, and CP 
was unable to rouse the residents of the trailer houses in the area.  Eventually, a passing 
car stopped and its occupants summoned help. 
Id.  
151 Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977). 
152 Id. at 147.   
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“not have anticipated the fatal accident.”153 The judge advised the jury that “a person 
acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance . . . when he is aware of and 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or 
that such circumstance exists.”154 The perilous situation in which the defendants left the 
victim – including the rural location – thus supported the finding of “a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk” of death.   
While most cases in which the vulnerability stemming from spatial isolation has 
influenced a legal outcome do not involve gender issues, a few do.  In a 2004 decision, 
for example, the Indiana Court of Appeals upheld an administrative law judge’s ruling 
that an employer had sexually harassed two women who worked in his home, which 
served as the office for his elevator installation business.155 The court determined that the 
employer, sole proprietor of the business, harassed two secretaries who worked for him 
for consecutive periods.  Among the allegations were that he appeared before them semi-
clad (no shirt) and finished dressing in their presence; showed pictures of himself and his 
prior girlfriend skinny dipping; said his bathtub was large enough for two; called them 
into his bedroom to see something on television; and told them that he should put golden 
arches, standing for “2,000 served” over his bed.156 The court quoted the ALJ’s findings 
of fact (endorsed by the Indiana Civil Rights Commission), with respect to each woman, 
that the woman and her employer “worked in a house, with nobody else present, subject 
to visitors rarely and only by appointment and that the house was located in a rural, 
 
153 Id. at 148.   
154 Id. at 149.   
155 Zeller Elevator Co. v. Slygh, 796 N.E.2d 1198 (Ind. App. 2004).   
156 Id. at 1202-05.   
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sparsely populated area.”157 In upholding the decisions below, the court cited Seventh 
Circuit precedent for the proposition that the “presence or absence of other persons and 
other aspects of context” are relevant to the determination of harassment.158 The opinion 
emphasized the rural location of the employer’s home-based business – noting it three 
additional times.159 The court thus clearly saw the rural setting – because it connoted the 
absence of the other persons – as critical context in assessing sexual harassment.    
Similarly, some intimate abuse cases have also acknowledged the aggravated 
vulnerability associated with presence in rural areas.  The Nebraska Court of Appeals in 
2001, for example, cited a woman’s situation in a rural area as justification for shooting 
her husband.  The court held that the sentencing judge had abused his discretion by 
imposing an excessive sentence on the woman.160 He explained that she was “in a rural 
area with an intoxicated and angry person with a history of physical abuse who had only 
moments earlier abused her.”161 In another case, an abusive husband’s frequent threat 
while beating his wife, that “no one would ever hear a gun shot coming from their rural 
residence,” was cited in justification of a $340,000 damages award for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.162 These decisions, as well as those in other criminal 
contexts that recognize the enhanced vulnerability attendant to distance from sources of 
 
157 Id. at 1203 (Finding of Fact No. 24); 1204-05 (No. 55).   
158 Id. at 1213 (quoting Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
159 Id. at 1213 (“rural location”); 1215 (“rural, isolated area”); 1216 (“rural, isolated office”).   
160 State v. Oldenburg, 10 Neb. App. 104, 628 N.W.2d 278 (2001).   
161 Id. at 120, 628 N.W.2d at 120.  The court continued:  “These facts are not disputed.  Kurt’s claim that he 
was ‘incensed’ at having a gun pointed at him in his own home is a ridiculous excuse for charging at 
Charlene while she held a gun.  It can only mean that he intended to take that gun away from her.  No 
reasonable person in Charlene’s position, given the history of spousal abuse, would expect that Kurt would 
stop at merely taking the gun from her.  Kurt’s rights in his own home can be no greater than Charlene’s 
right to be free from physical abuse in her own bedroom.”  Id. The concurring judge offered an even more 
emphatic opinion reversing the trial judge.   
162 Moyer v. Moyer, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 6966 (3d Dist. 2005).   
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assistance, are good models for appropriate legal responses to rural women facing 
intimate abuse.   
 B.  Termination of Parental Rights 
The reservation is in a very rural area and commuting to Las Vegas is fifty 
plus miles.  And, we had at that time no suitable day care at the 
reservation.  He was an infant.  We had Head Start, but there was no way 
for her to leave him. 
Social worker testifying about obstacles to 
employment facing mother, whose parental 
rights were at stake.   
In re Bow (Nevada 1997) 
 
The same structural barriers that contribute so significantly to rural poverty – poor 
educational and job opportunities, lack of child care and transportation, among others – 
frequently shape the situations that put rural mothers at risk for termination of their 
parental rights.  Procedures and substantive law regarding termination of parental rights 
vary somewhat from state to state, but they usually involve a fact-intensive inquiry that 
scrutinizes the given parent’s behavior.  Courts frequently discuss not only the parent’s 
history of interaction with the child(ren), but also her employment record, education 
level, and other factors, such as tolerance of domestic violence.163 While some courts 
show considerable empathy for the particular challenges a rural parent has faced, others 
appear oblivious to the realities confronting her.   
In some cases, the very decision to live in a rural area is held against a mother.  In 
such cases, the rural locale of the mother’s home appears to be the proverbial last straw, 
 
163 Indeed, in many jurisdictions, domestic violence is included on a list of factors to be considered in 
making the determination re: parental rights.  Exposure to domestic violence may support a state’s case for 
termination of parental rights. See, e.g., In re Eventyr J., 120 N.M. 463,468, 902 P.2d 1066, 1069, 1071 
(1995) (supporting decision to terminate parental rights with a statement that the mother “had exposed the 
children to domestic violence….Respondent admitted that, after a dispute with her boyfriend, she once 
brandished her shotgun in the presence of the children because she was afraid the boyfriend might return”).     
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as other factors already weigh against her.  In a 2001 Iowa decision, for example, the 
court opined that the mother had “not demonstrated that she can act in the best interests 
of her children.”164 The court cited as an example the fact that she “was living in a trailer 
park in a rural area, isolated from services, shopping, or neighborhood resources.”165 It 
noted both the mother’s lack of transportation and the lack of services within walking 
distance,166 having already recited the mother’s history of abusive relationships, as well 
as her job and housing insecurity while her case was pending.167 
A 2002 Delaware decision held against the mother her decision to live with her 
mother, the child’s grandmother, “in rural New Castle County along Route 13 away from 
regular lines of public transportation,” which made her dependent on others to get to 
work.168 While the court listed a number of other factors in support of its decision to 
terminate the mother’s parental rights,169 it also noted that the mother had rejected the 
option of relocating to a shelter where she could “receive services and live with her 
daughter.”170 
164 In the Interest of A.H., 2001 Iowa App. LEXIS 832 (2001). 
165 Id. at *7.   
166 Id. 
167 Id. at *6-7.    
168 Division of Family Services v.  Lxxxxx and Cxxxxx, 801 A.2d 12, 21 (Del. Fam Ct. 2002).  The court 
also wrote:   
Residing in Grandmother’s home may provide Mother with temporary shelter, but at 
what cost.  Living there subjects Mother to complete dependence upon maternal 
Grandmother for food, transportation and the ability to be employed in addition to 
shelter.  Grandmother’s residence lacks sufficient number of bedrooms, Mother having 
indicated that if Kxxxx were returned to her there, Mother would sleep in the living 
room; it provides no access to public transportation which Mother requires in light of 
Mother’s inability to drive and the expressed reluctance by maternal Grandmother to 
assist Mother in gaining driving experience through the use of Grandmother’s 
automobile; and ultimately residing there would place Kxxxx back in an environment 
with an established history of interpersonal conflict as well as physical and emotional 
abuse.   
Id. at 25.   
169 Id. at 25.   
170 Id. 
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While these courts recognized the added transportation challenges and attendant 
isolation from services that rural parents face, they appear not to see that the given parent 
has few housing options other than those in the rural locale.  By judging women harshly 
for living in rural areas and suggesting that they move to more populous ones, these 
decisions go beyond the remedial actions dictated in other contexts.  That is, in the 
workers’ compensation and disability settings, for example, courts have held that rural 
residents need not re-locate to a larger job market in order to secure replacement 
employment.  They are allowed to receive benefits while continuing to live in rural areas 
where the limited labor market leaves them without appropriate employment options.171 
By suggesting a woman should have moved to the city or should do so now, these 
parental rights cases also imply that places are fungible.  In so doing, they overlook 
another rural reality:  the greater attachment to place that many rural residents feel.172 As 
discussed in Part I, many rural women are reliant on the networks they have accrued in 
their home community, and abandoning them would represent a significant loss.173 By 
telling these women to move to the city, courts reveal their urban bias.   
Other judges are more attuned to the realities of rural living and sensitive to its 
consequences.  A dissenting judge in a 1997 Nevada case, In Re Bow, showed particular 
sensitivity to the burdens stemming from spatial isolation from educational options and 
foster homes, as well as the limited job opportunities available to rural parents.174 The 
Native American mother whose rights were at stake, Adrina Recodo, was living with her 
 
171 See infra notes [    ] (discussing decisions that do not penalize rural residents for the limited job market 
and which do not require the residents to move in order to secure replacement employment).   
172 See Rosser, supra note 81, at 14; Taking Stock, supra note 21, at 16 (rural residents are less likely to 
move than their urban counterparts); Karen Anijar, Reframing Rural Education—Through Slippage and 
Memory, in THE HIDDEN AMERICA, supra note 34, at 236 (most of population for study of students in rural 
South were born in area of residence). 
173 See infra Part I (B).   
174 930 P.2d 1128 (Nev. 1997).   
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grandparents in rural Southern Nevada when she gave birth to her son Michael.175 When 
Michael was 14 months old, Recodo voluntarily placed him in foster care because she 
was unable to care for him.176 She and the tribe’s social worker made a six-month plan 
whereby Recodo would complete her GED, look for employment in Las Vegas on 
weekdays, and care for Michael on weekends.177 
During this time Recodo struggled to get into Las Vegas everyday.  She drove her 
grandfather’s car until she was unable to afford gas, and then she stayed with friends or 
studied and slept in her car.  According to the case report, “Recodo also testified that at 
this point her financial situation was so bad that often she would not eat for days just so 
she could afford to drive to Las Vegas to attend school and to try to find a job.”178 
Eventually, Recodo no longer had access to a car, but she rode her bike or tried to get 
rides with friends into Las Vegas.179 Conflicting evidence was presented regarding the 
frequency of Recodo’s visits to her son, but a trial judge determined that she saw him 
only three times during one 15-month period.180 She held two jobs during part of that 
period but lost both because of insubordination.181 
A judge terminated Recodo’s parental rights to Michael following a hearing in 
May, 1995, and the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the decision.182 Justice Springer 
disagreed, offering this alternative summation of facts in dissent:   
 
175 Recodo had four other children at the time of the hearing.  Three lived with her former husband, who 
had beaten her during their marriage, and a daughter lived with Recodo at her grandmother’s house.  Id. at 
1129.   
176 Id. at 1129.  Justice Springer disputed the voluntary nature of the placement.  Id. at 1137. 
177 Id. at 1130.   
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 1131.   
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 1134.  The appellate court found sufficient evidence to support the decision, and it concluded that 
she had not been denied her due process rights.   
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Adrina Recodo was the victim of an abusive domestic relationship, 
and she sought the help of a social worker on the Paiutes Reservation, 
stating that she was having problems taking care of her son after she got 
out of the relationship.   She told her case worker that she had no income, 
no place to live, and no transportation.  In need of money, food and a place 
to live, the State's response was to send Ms. Recodo to a psychologist.   
The State also decided to take her son away from her and to place him in 
foster care.   Ms. Recodo was destitute; and on many occasions she was 
faced with the choice of eating or spending the money on transportation 
that would take her to school or to try and find a job.183 
He said Ms. Recodo had “tried” to better her situation so that she could keep her son, and 
he criticized the State for its position that they held no responsibility for helping her.184 
He quoted the appellant’s social worker, who recognized that transportation and child 
care were major problems in light of Recodo’s rural home:  
The reservation is in a very rural area and commuting to Las Vegas 
is fifty plus miles.   And, we had at that time no suitable day care at 
the reservation.  He was an infant.  We had Head Start, but there 
was no way for her to leave him.185 
Justice Springer concluded by characterizing the obstacles put in the way of Ms. Recodo 
as “almost insurmountable.”186 He thus offered not only a much more empathic vignette; 
he expressly discussed the particular burden that spatial isolation cast upon this rural 
mother.   
Like Justice Springer’s dissent in Bow, other judges have been more sensitive to 
the particular structural barriers that rural parents face.  One court lauded rural parents 
specifically for making bi-monthly visits to their children, “despite the hardships 
attendant to living in a rural area without private transportation.”187 Another court 
 
183 Id. at 1137.   
184 Id. at 1137-38 (emphasis original).  Justice Springer expressed disapproval of the majority’s statement 
that “the [Welfare] Division cannot be expected to get Recodo a job, a home, and to provide financial 
stability.”  Id. 
185 Id. at 1138.   
186 Id. at 1137-38.   
187 In re: PAB, MEB, MAB, 391 Pa. Super. 79, 81, 570 A.2d 522, 523 (1990).   
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reversed the termination of parental rights of a woman who left her daughter with a 
relative and did not re-claim her for several weeks.188 That court excused the mother’s 
actions because she had taken refuge from her abusive husband (who had recently 
sexually abused their other daughter) in a rural locale where she had no transportation or 
telephone.189 
Though none of these decisions turned solely on the rural setting, the locale is 
highly relevant – and indeed integrally linked – to the structural challenges these parents 
faced.  Indeed, the spatial isolation and attendant transportation challenges that 
characterize rural living aggravate disadvantage that would otherwise simply reflect 
socioeconomic class.  Further, long-time rural residents’ attachment to place means that 
the place – the rural setting – should be central to assessing the parents’ choices and 
behavior.  As a critical piece of context, it will very often represent a mitigating factor.             
 
C.  Abortion  
While traveling seventy miles on secondary roads may be inconsequential 
to my brethren in the majority who live in the urban sprawl of Baltimore, 
as the district court below and I conclude, such is not to be so casually 
addressed and treated with cavil when considering the plight and effect on 
a woman residing in rural Beaufort County, South Carolina. 
 
Dissenting Judge Hamilton  
 Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant  
 (4th Cir. 2000)  
 
Abortion is perhaps the only legal context in which the particular realities of rural 
women have been an explicit focus – if only barely and briefly – in making law.  Several 
decisions have closely examined facts detailing the obstacles that informed consent and 
 
188 Robinette v. Keene, 2 Va. App. 578, 580, 582, 584, 347 S.E.2d 156, 157-58, 160 (1986). 
189 Id. at 580, 582, 584, 347 S.E.2d at 157-58, 160.   
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waiting period requirements represent for rural women seeking abortions.  While such 
consideration has not led to success in securing a less restricted abortion right, it has put 
rural women on the radar screens of feminists as a distinct population of women who 
share some significant challenges.190 In the following sections, I scrutinize judicial 
responses to evidence about hardships which, collectively, are unique to rural women.191 
I conclude that in the abortion context as in several others, the law has turned a blind eye 
to the very real plight of this population.    
190 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey in 
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2025, 2038 (1994) (noting that regulations 
unconstitutional in Pennsylvania might not be in more rural or poorer states); Valerie Pacer, Salvaging the 
Undue Burden Standard—is it a Lost Cause?, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 295, 310 (1995) (arguing that undue 
burden standard has a disparate impact on women who are poor, young, battered, and/or rural); Caitlin E. 
Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights after Casey and Carhart, 31 Fordham Urb. L.J. 
675, 716 (2004) (arguing that individual restrictions on abortion “pile up” especially for poor and rural 
women). 
191 Prior to Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a few abortion decisions explicitly considered the situation of 
rural women.  In Planned Parenthood League v. Belotti, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in 1981 struck 
down a Massachusetts law that imposed a 24-hour waiting period.  The court wrote that the burdens in 
terms of time, money, travel and work schedules would be “substantial,” especially for the “poor, the rural, 
and those with pressing obligations.”  641 F.2d 1006, 1015 (1st. Cir. 1981).  
The federal district court in Hodgson v. Minnesota, for example, grappled with the realities of 
rural women’s lives – both in terms of spatial isolation from services and lack of anonymity.  648 F. Supp. 
756, 770, 779 (D. Minn. 1986).  The court wrote:   
In view of the logistical obstacles facing Minnesota women who live in counties without 
a regular provider of abortion services, the court believes a 48 hour waiting period is 
excessively long.   Travel to an abortion provider, particularly in winter from a rural area 
in Minnesota, can be a very burdensome undertaking.   A requirement that a minor either 
bear this burden twice or spend up to three additional days in a city distant from her home 
cannot be justified by the State's interests in encouraging parental consultation, because a 
shorter waiting period would effectuate that interest as completely.       
Id. at 779.  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversal of the decision did not mention rural 
women. 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988).  Only Justice Brennan, dissenting from the Supreme 
Court’s affirmation of the Eighth Circuit, again briefly acknowledged rural women.  He noted that 
because judges in some counties refuse to hear bypass procedures, women must travel to judges 
who will.  He wrote that the burden of doing so, which often requires “an overnight stay in a 
distant city is particularly heavy for poor women from rural areas.”  497 U.S. 417, 476 (Brennan, 
J. dissenting).  
 In the 1977 decision in Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 
city hospital’s refusal to perform abortions for indigent women, even though it provided full prenatal care 
to those carrying babies to term, was not an equal protection violation.  Justice Brennan, writing for three 
dissenters, called the unavailability of abortion in public hospitals an “insuperable obstacle” and noted that 
the decision would be “felt most strongly in rural areas, where the public hospital will in all likelihood be 
closed to elective abortions” and where demand for a separate abortion clinic will be insufficient.  Id. at 
524 (citing Sullivan, Tietze & Dreyfoos, Legal Abortion in the United States, 1975-76, 9 FAMILY 
PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 116, 121, 128 (1977)).   
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1.  Casey and the Undue Burden Test. In its 1992 decision, Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,192 the U.S. Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the basic holding of Roe v. Wade:193 every woman has a fundamental right to 
obtain an abortion prior to fetal viability.  But, the Casey Court altered the legal analysis 
by developing the undue burden test for determining the constitutionality of laws 
restricting abortion.194 The Court applied the test to several restrictions in a Pennsylvania 
law:  a spousal notification requirement, a parental notification requirement, and a 
mandatory informed consent provision that included a 24-hour waiting period.  The Court 
explained that “[a] finding of undue burden is shorthand for the conclusion that a state 
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a 
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”195 The joint opinion in Casey did not, 
however, provide much instruction about how lower courts should determine whether a 
regulation’s purpose is to impose an undue burden.196 
At first blush, the undue burden inquiry appears to be a fact-intensive one.  
Indeed, the Casey Court’s analysis of the so-called spousal notification provision,197 
192 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
193 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
194 See, e.g., Ruth Burdick, The Casey Undue Burden Standard: Problems Predicted and Encountered, and 
the Split over the Salerno Test, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 825 (1995-1996); Sandra Lynne Tholen & Lisa 
Baird, Con Law Is As Con Law Does: A Survey of Planned Parenthood v. Casey in the State and Federal 
Courts, 28 LOY.L.A.L REV. 971 (1994-1995).  
195 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (emphasis added).   
196 See Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 354 (5th Cir. 1999). 
197 The state law required a woman to produce a signed statement certifying that she had notified her 
husband of her intent to have an abortion.  Id. at 887-898.  The spousal notification provision contained 
some narrow exceptions, including for situations where the woman certified that her spouse was not the 
father of her child; she could not find her spouse; the pregnancy was the result of a sexual assault by her 
spouse which she reported; or she had reason to believe that notifying her spouse would cause him, or 
another, to inflict bodily injury upon her. Id. at 908-909.  A physician who performed an abortion without 
obtaining the required statement would have her license revoked and be liable to the woman’s husband for 
damages.  Id. at 887-88.   
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which it declared an undue burden, was fact driven.198 The plurality devoted twelve 
pages to discussing this provision, examining both the trial court’s extensive findings of 
fact,199 and an American Medical Association summary of research about domestic 
violence.200 The court acknowledged that between two and four million women are 
victims of severe domestic violence each year, with the worst abuse sometimes 
associated with pregnancy.201 The Court determined that the spousal notification 
provision “was likely to prevent a significant number of women from obtaining an 
abortion.”202 Because many instances of domestic violence (i.e., unreported marital 
sexual assault, psychological abuse, spousal infliction of harm upon a woman’s family 
members) did not fall within the relatively narrow exceptions to the spousal notification 
requirement, it would not simply make abortions more difficult to procure, but would 
actually deter some women entirely, thus imposing an undue burden.203 Although the 
Court found that the provision imposed no burden on the vast majority of women seeking 
an abortion, it analyzed whether the provision was an undue burden only in relation to the 
admittedly very small population of women it would affect:  those who were unwilling to 
share their decision with their spouse for fear of retaliatory violence.204 
198 Id. at 887-99.   
199 The District Court found that “[t]he vast majority of women consult their husbands prior to deciding to 
terminate their pregnancy,” but it also determined that “[a] wife may not elect to notify her husband of her 
intention to have an abortion for a variety of reasons…” Id. at 888.  The spousal notification requirement 
would “…force women to reveal their most intimate decision-making on pain of criminal sanctions,” but 
“the confidentiality of these revelations could not be guaranteed, since the woman’s records are not 
immune from subpoena…”  Id. at 889.   
200 Id. at 888-91.   
201 Id.
202 Id. at 894.   
203 Id.
204 Even though the spousal notification requirement would affect less than one percent of women seeking 
an abortion, the Casey Court decided that “the proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom 
the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”  Id. 
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Aside from the spousal notification provision, though, the Casey Court offered 
little close factual examination of obstacles created by other aspects of the Pennsylvania 
law.  It upheld the law’s parental notification provision for minors by stating simply, 
“[w]e have been over this ground before.”205 The Court reaffirmed prior decisions 
holding that a law requiring a minor seeking an abortion to get parental consent is 
constitutional, so long as it includes an adequate judicial bypass procedure.206 
The Casey Court’s handling of the waiting period requirement is more 
complicated because of conflicts between the district court’s factual findings and those 
the Third Circuit chose to examine. The district court found that “for those women who 
have the fewest financial resources, those who must travel long distances, and those who 
have difficulty explaining their whereabouts to husbands, employers, or others, the 24-
hour waiting period will be ‘particularly burdensome.’”207 It then concluded that the 
waiting period would require every woman to make two trips to an abortion provider and 
that 42 percent of women would have to travel more than an hour just to get to the nearest 
clinic.208 
The Third Circuit retreated, finding that the waiting period “may” require two 
visits to a clinic.209 That court went on to conclude that “the wait does not prevent any 
 
205 Id. at 899. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 886.   
208 The district court noted that in 1988, 58% of women getting abortions in the state had resided in just five 
of Pennsylvania’s counties, meaning women living in any of the “other 62 counties must travel for at least 
one hour, and sometimes longer than three hours, to obtain an abortion from the nearest provider.”  744 F. 
Supp. 1323, 1351 (E.D. Pa. 1990).   
209 Id. at 706 (emphasis added).  “[T]his means that the overall cost of an abortion to her may increase by a 
significant percentage.”  Id. Planned Parenthood’s petition for certiorari discussed this problem, noting that 
the Third Circuit had “substituted for the record actually developed here a factual finding implicitly 
adopted in a different case involving completely distinct issues.”  1992 WL 551419 at 49-50.  Planned 
Parenthood argued that if undisputed factual findings could be discarded so cavalierly, the undue burden 
test was “truly meaningless.” Id. The Supreme Court, however, never touched on the substituted factual 
record, and seems to have accepted the Third Circuit’s version of it.   
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women from having an abortion.”210 Rather than adhering to the factual findings below, 
the appellate court seems to have altered them slightly to support a different result.  
Although the Supreme Court purported to analyze the district court’s findings of fact, 
referring to some of them as “troubling in some respects,”211 it played a semantic game 
with the district court’s conclusions.  The Supreme Court said the trial judge had not 
concluded “that the increased costs and potential delays amount to substantial 
obstacles,”212 the term it used to define “undue burden.”  The plurality continued:   
We also disagree with the District Court's conclusion that the "particularly 
burdensome" effects of the waiting period on some women require its 
invalidation.  A particular burden is not of necessity a substantial obstacle.   
Whether a burden falls on a particular group is a distinct inquiry from 
whether it is a substantial obstacle even as to the women in that group. 
And the District Court did not conclude that the waiting period is such an 
obstacle even for the women who are most burdened by it.  Hence, on the 
record before us, and in the context of this facial challenge, we are not 
convinced that the 24-hour waiting period constitutes an undue burden.213 
From the beginning, then, the undue burden standard was applied inconsistently.   
2.  Waiting Periods and Rural Women under Casey.
Because my elected task is to reconsider the burden that abortion restrictions 
place on rural women, I return to the district court’s detailed findings of fact regarding 
the waiting period.  In addition to determining that the waiting period would force all 
women seeking abortions in Pennsylvania to make at least two visits to an abortion 
provider, the court found that the waiting period would cause “delays far in excess of 24 
hours,” from 48 hours to two weeks because most clinics and physicians do not perform 
 
210 Id.  The Third Circuit also wrote that  “possible overinclusiveness of the provision does not render it 
irrational, especially given the serious and irreversible consequences of a hasty and ill-considered abortion 
decision.” 
211 Id. at 886 
212 Id.  
213 Id. at 886-87. 
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abortions every day.214 Because the mandatory wait would require women to double 
their travel time or stay overnight near an abortion facility, the court noted that many 
would not only incur added expenses for transportation, lodging, child care and food, but 
would also “lose additional wages or other compensation” if forced to miss work 
twice.215 Further, the court noted, delays associated with the waiting period would push 
some patients into the second trimester, thus substantially increasing the cost and risks of 
the procedure.216 
The court concluded:  “Finally, women living in rural areas and those women that 
have difficulty explaining their whereabouts, such as school age women, battered women, 
and working women without sick leave, will also experience significant burdens in 
attempting to effectuate their abortion decision, if a mandatory 24-hour waiting period 
were in place.”217 Although the district court did not utilize the undue burden standard, 
its findings indicate that the waiting period imposes significant burdens on some women.  
It specifically enumerated rural women as one such group.  
 Two organizations that filed amicus briefs with the Supreme Court on behalf of 
Planned Parenthood also closely examined the effects of the 24-hour waiting period and 
expressed concern for rural women.  The American Psychological Association’s brief 
highlighted the district court’s findings regarding travel distances.218 The brief observed 
that “[i]n many geographic areas of the country, women live long distances, even 
 
214 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1351 (emphasis added) 
215 Id. 
216 Id. at 1351-52 (emphasis added). 
217 Id. at 1379 (emphasis added). 
218 1992 WL 12006399 (U.S., Mar. 06, 1992).  These included the fact that one clinic was the primary 
abortion provider for eighteen counties, and that among another clinic’s patients, 909 traveled at least 100 
miles to reach the clinic.  Id. at 29. 
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hundreds of miles, from the nearest abortion provider.”219 It also cited research showing 
that the greater a woman’s distance from a provider, the less likely she is to procure an 
abortion.220 
The NAACP’s also filed an amicus brief, which focused in part on the waiting 
period’s impact on low-income urban women, 221 and also called special attention to the 
“acute” problem for rural women.  It cited data and examples from rural states, including 
the fact that not a single physician residing in North Dakota performs abortions, and only 
one South Dakota physician does so.  The sole abortion clinic in northern Minnesota 
serves 24 counties.222 The brief highlighted the fact that 82% of all U.S. counties – home 
to one-third of all reproductive-age women – had no abortion provider as of 1985 and 
that even more non-metro counties – 90% – have no provider.223 The NAACP thus 
argued that the mandatory waiting period would effectively prohibit abortion for poor 
 
219 Id. at 29. 
220 Id. at 28-29 (citing  Shelton, Brann & Shultz, Abortion Utilization: Does Travel Distance Matter?, 8 J. 
FAM. PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 260 (1976); Henshaw & VanVort, Abortion Services in the United States, 
1987 and 1988, 22 J. FAM. PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 102, 105 (1990)).  In non-metro areas, 93% of 
counties have no provider, and 83% of (non-metro) women live in those counties.  Henshaw & VanVort at 
106. 
221 1992 WL 12006401 (U.S., Mar. 06, 1992).  It noted that women with family incomes under $11,000 are 
almost four times more likely to have an abortion that those with family incomes over $25,000.  Id. at 17-
18 (citing Radecki, A Racial and Ethnic Comparison of Family Formation and Contraceptive Practices 
Among Low-Income Women, 106 Pub. Health Rep. 494, at n. 32, 33 (Sept./Oct. 1991)).  “At least one study 
indicates that for women below the poverty level, six out of ten births are unintended, i.e., unwanted or 
mistimed, compared to three out of ten births to women above 200% of the poverty level.” Id. The brief 
attributed the higher rate of unintended pregnancies among poor women to the greater incidence of 
contraceptive failure and their preference for fewer children.  Id. 
222 Id. at 20-21.  The brief noted the particular plight of Native American women, who often live in rural 
areas:   
In particular, poor Native American women face some of the largest obstacles, since 
the Indian Health Services, which may be the only familiar provider of health care and 
the only health service available for hundreds of miles, is prohibited from performing 
abortions even if women can find the monetary resources to pay for the procedure 
themselves.  
Id. 
223 Id. at 20.  The brief cited as an example the Women's Health Services (WHS) clinic in Pittsburgh which 
serves 34 counties in Pennsylvania, portions of Ohio, West Virginia, Maryland and New York. That 
agency's Executive Director stated that women often travel three or four hours to reach the clinic, 
sometimes much longer if they travel by bus.  Id. 
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women because of the increased cost of obtaining an abortion, 224 as well as “barriers of 
distance and mobility.”225 
In their arguments to the Supreme Court, both Planned Parenthood and amici 
curiae thus highlighted the plight of rural women as a group or class, with further 
emphasis on the aggravated burden for poor rural women.  Yet the Justices in the Casey 
plurality were unmoved by evidence of these burdens.  The Court concluded that while 
the increased cost and inconvenience to women might make it difficult for them to get 
abortions, it would not actually deter them.  Indeed, in spite of the district court and 
plaintiffs’ attention to rural women, the word “rural” appears only once in 168 pages of 
Casey opinions:  Justice Blackmun’s separate opinion quoted the district court’s finding 
that the waiting period “would pose especially significant burdens on women living in 
rural areas and those women that have difficulty explaining their whereabouts.”226 
When a majority of Justices in Casey concluded that the threat of domestic 
violence from the spousal notification provision would deter women, but that the 24-hour 
waiting period would merely inconvenience them, it set up a dichotomy between violence 
(or the threat of it) on one hand, and economic disaster (or the threat of it) on the other.227 
The Court essentially assumed that women will forego abortion to avoid the former but 
not the latter.  This assumption, however, is unfounded.  While I do not dismiss or 
 
224 Id. at 22.   
225 Id. at 20.  “Because most poor women have access only to county clinics, they often must wait weeks 
for an appointment; at a crowded city clinic in New York, the wait time for an appointment was 4-15 
weeks.”  Id. 
226 Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 937 (Blackmun, J.)(citing Casey I, 744 F.Supp. 1323, 1378-79 (E.D.Pa. 1990)).  
The plurality, however, did quote the district court as having found “that for those women who have the 
fewest financial resources, those who must travel long distances, and those who have difficulty explaining 
their whereabouts to husbands, employers, or others, the 24-hour waiting period will be ‘particularly 
burdensome.”  Id. at 886 (quoting Casey I, 744 F. Supp. at 1352).   
227 See infra text accompany notes [    ] (discussing threat of violence by anti-abortion protesters, if it 
existed, as a reason to re-examine the two-trip requirement under Indiana law); infra notes [    ] (discussing 
the constitutionality of FACE). 
- 49 -
downplay the significance and severity of physical abuse, it bears noting that many 
victims of intimate abuse remain with their abusers for financial reasons.228 Women 
sometimes opt not to leave, for example, because without the male breadwinner they do 
not have the financial resources to support themselves and their children.  They endure 
violence in order to avoid poverty.  Ironically, the plurality in Casey recognized this 
phenomenon in analyzing the spousal notification provision, and it cited empirical 
research in support of it.229 The plurality nevertheless elsewhere held that waiting 
periods do not constitute undue burdens – not even on rural women.  The Court believed 
that waiting periods will simply be an inconvenience to some women, whereas fear of 
intimate abuse will altogether prevent them from pursuing an abortion.   
 But survival is about more than avoiding a beating.  If a woman will endure 
violence in order to be able to feed herself and her family, the chances are also good that 
she will forego an abortion in order to do so.  Thus, the Casey Court was only half right 
about self-preservation in relation to abortion.  It was correct about women’s likely 
response to the spousal notification provision, but it ignored the connection between the 
perils of physical violence on the one hand and economic disaster on the other.   If, as 
even the Casey plurality recognized, women will endure physical violence to prevent 
financial ruin, they will forego abortion for the same purpose.   
228 There is support for the proposition that women engage in a cost-benefit analysis before deciding to 
leave an abusive partner.  Financial concerns, particularly when children are involved, make the final 
decision to leave more difficult.  See, e.g., Kristina Coop Gordon et al., Predicting the Intentions of Women 
in Domestic Violence Shelters to Return to Partners: Does Forgiveness Play a Role, 18 J. OF FAMILY 
PSYCH. 331 (2004) (suggesting that lack of personal income and low potential for securing employment are 
factors that weigh in favor of staying in the relationship); Helen M. Hendey et al., Decision to Leave Scale: 
Perceived Reasons to Stay in or Leave Violent Relationships, 27 PSYCH. OF WOMEN Q. 162, 163 (2003) 
(stating that women are “more reluctant to leave violent relationships when they have investments of time, 
marriage, money, children or emotional attachment”).   
229 Casey, 505 U.S. at 891-92 (citing Herbert, Silver & Ellard, Coping with an Abusive Relationship:  How 
and Why do W omen Stay? 53 J. MARRIAGE & THE FAMILY 311 (1991); Aguirre, Why Do They Return?  
Abused Wives in Shelters, 30 J. NAT. ASSN. OF SOCIAL WORKERS 350, 352 (1985) (abused women may 
return to their abusers because they have no other source of income)).    
- 50 -
3.  Post-Casey Decisions. The Casey Court explicitly stated that it was deciding 
only the case before it, leaving the door open for other challenges to the provisions it 
upheld.230 Subsequent courts have nevertheless been reluctant to deviate from Casey’s 
holdings.  As Gillian Metzger observes, “regulations that are not burdensome in 
Pennsylvania may well be burdensome in other states where there are fewer abortion 
providers or a more rural and poorer population.”231 By and large, however, courts have 
been unwilling to examine in detail the particular burdens on the women in a state whose 
abortion regulations are challenged.  Yet states continue to enact regulations that prevent 
at least some women – including those living some distance from an abortion provider – 
from exercising their right to an abortion.  These regulations not only impose waiting 
period and informed consent requirements, some also involve parental consent for 
minors.     
a.  Mandatory Waiting Periods, Informed Consent Laws and Spatial 
Isolation. Utah Women’s Clinic v. Leavitt232 is an excellent example of the tendency of 
post-Casey courts to assess constitutionality based more on a provision’s text than on the 
factual record.233 The plaintiffs in Leavitt argued that because Utah is larger than 
 
230 Id. at 887.   
231 Metzger, supra note [   ], at 2038.   
232 844 F.Supp 1482, 1491 (D. Utah 1994). 
233 Karlin v. Foust is another good example. 188 F.3d 446, 486 (7th Cir. 1999).  The plaintiffs there 
similarly presented evidence of “factual and demographic differences between Pennsylvania and 
Wisconsin” focusing on “the geographic distribution and scarcity of abortion providers in relation to the 
female population of Wisconsin.”  The court was not convinced, however, concluding that “the 
demographic differences between the two states were not significant enough to suggest that Wisconsin 
women are quantitatively more burdened” by the Wisconsin law than Pennsylvania women had been by the 
mandatory wait in Casey. Id. at 486.  The court also went into a detailed discussion of the plaintiffs’ 
argument, based on a study of a Mississippi abortion regulation that had arguably caused a sharp decline in 
the number of abortions in that state.  The plaintiffs argued that Wisconsin and Mississippi were analogous, 
but the Seventh Circuit, like the district court, found the Mississippi study methodologically flawed.  The 
court said the study had not controlled for the “persuasive effect of the law.”  Id. at 487.  That is, the court 
speculated that the number of abortions in Mississippi might have declined not because the waiting period 
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Pennsylvania and has only one metropolitan area, a 24-hour waiting period would be 
more burdensome in that state than an equivalent regulation in Pennsylvania.  Because 
the Utah regulation was less restrictive than the provision upheld in Casey, however, the 
federal district court concluded that it must be constitutional.  Finding no significant 
differences either between the Utah and Pennsylvania laws or in how they would affect 
women in their respective states,234 the court went as far as to call the plaintiffs’ argument 
a “red herring.”235 
The Leavitt judge reasoned that all women seeking abortions must travel to a 
clinic for the procedure, but that because the “travel burden is not a factor of state law,” 
“getting to a clinic has absolutely nothing to do with the constitutional inquiry here.”236 
The court offered this hypothetical by way of explanation for its logic:   
A woman in Alaska, for example, could be required to travel 800 miles to 
get to an abortion clinic merely because she lives in one place and the 
nearest abortion clinic is on the other side of the state.   But that certainly 
doesn't constitute anything even approaching an undue burden.  Roe v. 
Wade may have established a constitutional right to an abortion, but it did 
not require that a state provide abortion clinics in close proximity to every 
woman's home.  On the other hand, a waiting period which may require 
two visits to a clinic imposes an additional burden.  For some women, this 
burden will require that they double their travel time by making a second 
trip to the clinic.  For other women, in a worst-case scenario where the 
distance is such that it is impracticable to make a return visit, the burden 
will require an overnight stay at a location near the clinic. 237 
Thus, the district court in Utah saw the regulation’s greatest burden on any woman – no 
matter where she lived in proximity to an abortion provider – as being an overnight stay 
 
made getting an abortion more difficult, but because the materials presented as part of the informed consent 
law convinced women not to get abortions.  Id. 
234 Id. at 1491.  
235 Id. at 1491, n. 11.   
236 Id. at 1491, n. 11.   
237 Id. at 1491, n. 11.   
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near that provider.  It dismissed the possibility that some women would have to make two 
trips and therefore never considered that multiple trips might each be several days long. 
Because the Casey Court had not viewed that overnight stay as an undue burden, Leavitt 
reasoned that the Utah provision also did not constitute one.238 
Other judges in the post-Casey era have shown greater empathy for the plight of 
rural women seeking abortion in the face of mandatory waiting periods.  These judges, 
however, have been federal district judges who were subsequently overruled or dissenters 
from the decisions of Courts of Appeals.  They have nevertheless called attention to the 
circumstances of rural women despite colleagues in the majority who, like the district 
judge in Leavitt, disregarded details of the obstacles facing rural women, or who saw the 
obstacles as being “merely” financial.   
Although the Mississippi Supreme Court in 1998 upheld state regulations that 
imposed a mandatory 24-hour waiting period,239 Justice Sullivan’s dissent highlighted the 
“undue burden on low-income women living in rural areas.” 240 Disputing the 
chancellor’s characterization of this burden as “mere inconvenience,” Justice Sullivan 
argued that the plaintiffs successfully demonstrated that the restrictions would preclude 
“a substantial number of women from obtaining abortions altogether, and creat[e] an 
undue burden due to travel and lodging expenses, child care costs, loss of wages, and 
other compensation, and health risks.”241 Noting that only two Mississippi counties had 
abortion providers, Justice Sullivan argued that the law was unconstitutional even if it 
 
238 Id. The court thus concluded that rural Utah women will not necessarily have to make two trips.  Id. 
239 Pro-Choice Mississippi v. Fordice, 716 So.2d 645 (Miss. 1998).   The majority opinion did not use the 
word “rural.” 
240 Id. at 667 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).  
241 Id. 
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created an undue burden only for low-income women and those living in rural areas.242 
He also pointed to plaintiffs’ evidence that the number of Mississippi women obtaining 
abortions had decreased by 13 percent since the law went into effect, suggesting that the 
waiting period was actually preventing at least a tenth of the state’s women from 
terminating their pregnancies.243 
The Seventh Circuit in A Women’s Choice-East Side Clinic v. Newman, 244 
similarly upheld an Indiana informed consent law that required that a woman be given 
information in the presence of her doctor 18 hours before obtaining an abortion.  This 
2002 case was decided on probably the best developed factual record in the post-Casey 
era.  Yet the evidence presented swayed only Judge Diane Wood, in dissent, to agree with 
the federal district court that the law constituted an undue burden.   
The district court, relying in part on an updated version of the Mississippi study 
cited in Fordice, struck down the Indiana law as unconstitutional.245 It found that the 
supplemented study adequately demonstrated that the Mississippi law caused a 10 to13 
percent decrease in abortions among that state’s residents, as well as a significant 
 
242 Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-98, holding that spousal consent law was unconstitutional based on 
the small number of women with abusive husbands, for whom it would create an undue burden).  Justice 
Sullivan also pointed to plaintiffs’ evidence that the number of Mississippi women obtaining abortions had 
decreased by 13% since the law went into effect, indicating that it was in fact preventing many women 
from obtaining an abortion.  This study was later discredited in Karlin, supra note [   ], but supplemented 
prior to A Woman’s Choice, discussed infra at notes [    ] and accompanying text. 
243 Id. at 667.  The study also indicated that the number of second-trimester abortions in Mississippi had 
risen by 18% since the law went into effect.    
244 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002).  The decision also debated the burden represented by a so-called 
“presence” requirement.  The Indiana statute required information given to the women seeking the abortion 
and that the information is given to the woman in the “presence” of the physician or physician’s assistant.  
Id. at 685.  Information about abortions could therefore not be given in a pamphlet, by telephone, or 
through a web site.  Id. The “presence” requirement thereby required the pregnant woman to make two 
trips to the clinic—one for the information and the other to receive the abortion.  Id. The court held that the 
presence requirement did not create an undue burden on a woman’s right to abortion.  Id. at 693. 
245 132 F.Supp.2d 1150, 1173-74 (S.D.Ind.2001). The plaintiffs in Karlin v. Foust relied on the same study, 
but the court in that case questioned its validity.  It was supplemented before the trial in A Women’s Choice, 
correcting several aspects that had been criticized. 
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increase in more expensive, more dangerous second-trimester abortions.246 Based on 
these findings and on those of a similar study conducted in Utah, the court concluded that 
the waiting period would also cause the number of abortions performed in Indiana to 
decrease by 10 to 13 percent. The court further determined that this decline was due, not 
to the persuasive nature of the materials, but rather to obstacles imposed by the waiting 
period.247 
But two of three members of the Seventh Circuit panel viewed the factual 
evidence differently.  Judges Easterbrook and Coffey refused to accept the district court’s 
assessment of the study because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Indiana and 
Mississippi were similar and that the consequences of the Mississippi law were likely to 
be manifest in Indiana.  They believed that the 10 percent decline in abortions, rather than 
representing a practical consequence of the two-visit requirement, was simply a 
consequence of the persuasive effect of the information.  One asserted that Indiana should 
have its law “evaluated in light of experience in Indiana.” 248 Echoing Casey’s elevation 
of concerns about violence against women over other concerns about their well-being, he 
suggested that a two-trip requirement would constitute an undue burden only if it deterred 
women by increasing the possibility of violence against them.  Judge Easterbrook 
referred specifically to the “threat or actuality of violence at the hands of those tipped off 
by a preliminary visit,” and said if evidence of such violence came to light in Indiana, it 
would require reconsideration of informed consent laws across the nation.249 
246 Id. at 1173.  The court also found that the Mississippi law caused a significant increase in the number of 
that state’s residents who traveled out of state to obtain abortions and a significant decrease in the number 
of other states’ residents who came to Mississippi for abortions.  Id.    
247 Id. 
248 Id. at 692-693. 
249 Id.   
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Judge Coffey, also in the majority, openly flouted the hardships and concerns of 
the 10 to 13 percent of women who might be unable to obtain an abortion by noting that 
legislation which poses no substantial obstacle for 87 to 90 percent of a state's women, 
“and may have the incidental effect of reducing the demand for abortions by merely 10 to 
13 percent, is reasonable, sensible, and lawful.”250 He apparently disregarded the fact 
that those women deterred from getting an abortion by the mandatory waiting period (as 
many as 13%) were, in fact, unduly burdened by it.  Rather than seriously evaluating the 
evidence that substantiated the argument that waiting periods create undue burdens for 
some women, both Easterbrook and Coffey determined that because the waiting period 
would probably not increase violence against women, it was constitutional.   
Once again, it was the dissenting judge who attended to the concerns of rural 
women as a class.  Judge Wood wrote that Indiana, “like all states” has “significant rural 
areas and significant numbers of people living far from a reproductive health services 
facility.”251 She cited statistics indicating that Indiana, with 11 abortion providers, had 
one “for almost every 3,300 square miles.” 252 These clinics, which are not “distributed 
with perfect geographical regularity,” are most likely concentrated in cities, Judge Wood 
observed, meaning that women in rural Indiana lived “substantial distances from the 
nearest facility.”253 
250 Id. at 704. 
251 Id. at 711 (Wood, J., dissenting).  
252 Id. at 711.   
253 Id. Judge Wood continued:   
At most, the details the majority demands might suggest that more Indiana women can 
withstand the burdens of the Indiana statute than their counterparts in Mississippi could. 
But the question is not, for example, whether Indiana women as a group live closer to 
abortion clinics. It is whether an Indiana woman living 60 miles away from a clinic in 
Indiana who cannot afford (either financially, socially, or psychologically) to make two 
visits, will respond the same way a Mississippi woman living 60 miles away from a clinic 
in Mississippi with similar constraints did.  To repeat, Casey made it clear that the set of 
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The majority contingent in each of these opinions, like the federal district judge in 
Leavitt, overlooked or denied the realities of many rural women.  They also ignored a 
critical aspect of Casey’s undue burden analysis of the spousal notification requirement:  
the relevant group of women with respect to whom the requirement was to be assessed.  
Informed consent and waiting period provisions do, in fact, have a greater impact upon –
and are in fact a greater deterrent to abortion for rural women.  They are an even greater 
burden upon, and deterrent to, low-income rural women. 
I return to Leavitt and the geography of Utah to illustrate my point.  A working 
class woman in Salt Lake City who enjoys little work schedule flexibility would likely 
have difficulty securing time off to go through both the informed consent meeting and 
again to have the abortion.  She could, however, arrange the two different appointments 
on different days of the same week or on subsequent weeks, depending on her schedule.  
If she is without a vehicle but lives in the Salt Lake metro area, she will have some public 
transportation options to facilitate the journeys.  Making two trips will likely be 
inconvenient, even burdensome to her, and it may significantly increase the cost of the 
abortion if she must schedule her second appointment in the second trimester.  Still, the 
burden of the waiting period on her is unlikely to be as great as that on a woman living in 
southern Utah, as far as 300 miles from Salt Lake City.   
Consider, for example, a woman in Boulder, Utah, in the shadow of Grand 
Staircase-Escalante National Monument and 15 miles from Utah state highway 12.  She 
 
women we must consider are those who are burdened by the law, and it found 1% enough 
to justify striking down the spousal notification rule.  Maybe 10% of the women in 
Mississippi have that problem and "only" 3% of women in Indiana do.  No matter.  The 
district court was quite reasonable to find that women in Indiana are like all other people 
and that their responses will be the same as those of women elsewhere. 
Id. at 711-12.   
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is 327 miles (7 hours) from Las Vegas,254 367 miles (7 hours and 55 minutes) from 
Flagstaff,255 381 miles (7 hours and 58 minutes)from Aspen, Colorado,256 and a mere 261 
miles (5 hours and 29 minutes) from Salt Lake City,257 the locations of the four nearest 
abortion providers.  These one-way travel times assume the woman has access to private 
transportation.  If she does not and must rely on public transportation, her situation is 
even more dire.  Boulder, Utah has no public transportation services.  The nearest 
Greyhound bus stop is 143 miles (3 hours and 40 minutes) away258 in Parowan, Utah.259 
A woman without a car who lives in Boulder would thus have to borrow a car or hitch-
hike to Parowan and then take the bus to reach an abortion clinic.260 
Again, if we assume a working class woman with little work schedule flexibility, 
the woman in rural Utah may be unable to schedule her informed consent meeting and 
her abortion on consecutive days.  If, as Leavitt assumes, she is able to secure consecutive 
days off from work, her burden may nevertheless be greater than an overnight hotel stay.  
If she must travel several hours to reach the bus station and several more by bus to reach 
 
254 See 
http://maps.yahoo.com/dd_result?newaddr=&taddr=&csz=boulder+utah&country=us&tcsz=las+vegas+nev
ada&tcountry=us (last visited August 30, 2006). 
255 See 
http://maps.yahoo.com/dd_result?newaddr=&taddr=&csz=boulder+utah&country=us&tcsz=flagstaff+arizo
na&tcountry=us (last visited August 30, 2006).   
256 See 
http://maps.yahoo.com/dd_result?newaddr=&taddr=&csz=boulder+utah&country=us&tcsz=aspen+colorad
o&tcountry=us (last visited Sept. 4, 2006).   
257 See 
http://maps.yahoo.com/dd_result?newaddr=&taddr=&csz=boulder+utah&country=us&tcsz=salt+lake+city
+utah&tcountry=us (last visited August 30, 2006).   
258 See http://maps.google.com/maps?oi=map&q=Parowan,+UT (last visited Sept. 2, 2006).  See generally 
Eli Sanders, As Greyhound Cuts Back, The Middle of Nowhere Means Going Nowhere, N.Y.TIMES, Sept. 6, 
2004, at A10 (discussing the impact on rural America of Greyhound’s dramatic cuts in service).   
259 See http://www.greyhound.com/home.asp (last visited Sept. 2, 2006).  Parowan is located in Iron 
County, which is the county nearest to Boulder that has a public transportation network.  See 
http://www.apta.com/links/state_local/ut.cfm (last visited Sept. 2, 2006).   
260 Greyhound offers two buses a day from Parowan, Utah to Salt Lake City, one leaving at 2:50am and 
another leaving at 11:05am.  Each trip lasts four hours.  Buses from Salt Lake City to Parowan leave twice 
a day, at 8:30am and 6:00pm.  See http://www.greyhound.com/scripts/en/TicketCenter/Step3.asp (last 
visited Sept. 5, 2006). 
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the abortion provider, and again to return home, and if bus schedules are very limited, she 
may need three or more consecutive days off work – as well as several nights’ hotel stay 
– to accomplish the sought-after termination.  Also contrary to the Leavitt court’s 
assumption, the burden on a rural woman seeking an abortion may be greater than 
assumed in Casey because, in fact, she is unable to take several consecutive days off 
work.  Women in this situation will not only have to make two return journeys to Salt 
Lake City by whatever means are available, each of those journeys may require multiple 
days.  Thus, the worst-case scenario may not be merely an overnight stay.  It may be 
several days’ stay.  It may, in fact, require two journeys, each lasting several days.   
An even more dramatic example could be generated from the geography of 
Alaska, with its dearth of abortion services, which the Leavitt court facetiously used to 
illustrate its position that there is no constitutional right to convenience in procuring an 
abortion.261 But Casey made accessibility relevant by adopting the undue burden 
standard, and at some point, even the Leavitt court might concede, waiting periods 
constitute an undue burden for the most isolated, most disadvantaged women.  My aim is 
thus not to identify the most extreme example of hardship created by waiting periods.  It 
is, rather, to demonstrate that courts have not seriously considered the practical obstacles 
confronting rural women.  As Judge Wood wrote in A Woman’s Choice, the undue 
burden question “is whether an Indiana woman living 60 miles away from a clinic in 
Indiana who cannot afford (either financially, socially, or psychologically) to make two 
visits” will be deterred from exercising her fundamental right.262 It is not only about the 
 
261 Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. at 1491, n. 11.   
262 A Woman’s Choice, 305 F.2d at 711. Specifically, at this point in the opinion, Wood was arguing that 
the Mississippi study had shown that the state’s informed consent law had deterred Mississippi women 
from pursuing abortion.    
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woman who is worst-situated for getting an abortion; it is about all those who will be 
deterred by the regulation.   
Certainly, some women in rural areas will be better situated to secure abortions 
than others, even in states with mandatory waiting periods.  Women with job flexibility 
and security, access to a car, child care and – of course – money, will find it easier to 
overcome the obstacles.  But the Casey Court said that, for the purposes of analyzing any 
regulation, “[t]he proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a 
restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.”263 Further, the Casey Court 
found sufficient the mere 1% of all women who would be deterred by the Pennsylvania 
spousal notification requirement.  So, even taking Casey’s parsimonious approach to the 
undue burden test as the starting point, courts applying the standard have not only not 
been sensitive, they have not even been realistic about the very real barriers that 
regulations put in the way of rural women seeking abortion.   
While Leavitt may be correct that Roe v. Wade did not guarantee the right to 
convenience in procuring an abortion, at some point, waiting periods create so much 
“inconvenience” that they impede some women’s access to that right.  That is, they 
effectively preclude it.  This is surely the case for many rural women who live literally 
hours from the nearest abortion provider.  Their hardship is exacerbated by the specific 
circumstances that mark many of their lives: inadequate transportation, limited or 
nonexistent child care, lack of job flexibility and security, and overall economic 
vulnerability.  Each of these circumstances aggravates the burden that the mandatory 
waiting period imposes on a given rural woman.     
In contrast to these abortion decisions, precedents in other areas of the law 
 
263 Casey, 505 U.S. at 894. 
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acknowledge the reality, as well as the legal relevance, of the hardships created by spatial 
isolation from centers of commerce and the services located there. 264 In disability, 
workers compensation, and insurance coverage settings, for example, courts recognize 
that those who live in rural areas are at a disadvantage in seeking replacement 
employment, in receiving appropriate rehabilitation, and even in obtaining medical 
care.265 These judicial decisions appropriately accommodate the reality that many rural 
residents must travel significant distances for access to such services and opportunities.   
A trilogy of Colorado workers’ compensation cases is illustrative.266 The 
Colorado Supreme Court held in these consolidated cases that rural workers who could 
not secure replacement employment because of their limited rural labor markets could 
nevertheless receive benefits.267 Each of the cases involved a rural-dwelling worker with 
relatively few skills,268 and each had reached “maximum medical improvement.”  The 
 
264 In a rare civil procedure case addressing the practical effect of rural locale, a federal district court held 
that, because they “live in rural areas and lack resources and access to transportation,” migrant workers 
seeking to opt-in to a class action need not have their consents authenticated because it “could well present 
a heavy burden, if not an insuperable obstacle” to their participation.  Roebuck v. Hudson Valley Farms, 
239 F.Supp.2d 234, 240 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).   
265 See, e.g., Brodsky v. City of Phoenix Dept. Ret. System Bd., 900 P.2d 1228, 1232 (Ariz. 1995)(police 
officer with knee injury was still capable of “reasonable range of duties” in urban police department and 
thus not eligible for disability, although court recognized that a similarly disabled officer in a rural setting 
with smaller force might not be able to perform a reasonable range of duties for his department).   
 In a 2001 decision, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a former custodian 
with the transit authority who sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was not “substantially 
limited” in his ability to work because his back injury did not prevent him from finding alternate 
employment.  Duncan v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 240 F.3d 1110 (D.C.Cir. 2001).  
Concurring, Judge Randolph complained of the “geographic disparity” that would result from this rule.  He 
observed that if identical individuals with identical impairments worked for the same company, the one 
working in a rural area would “wind up being classified as disabled under the ADA more readily” than one 
in a “major metropolitan area where more jobs are available.”  Id. at 1118.   
266 Weld County School District v. Bymer, 955 P.2d 550 (Colo. 1998).   
267 Id.
268 These were two laborers with limited English skills who had completed the 4th grade in Mexico and a 
custodian whose injury prevented her from driving long distances.  Id. at 551-52.  In the first two cases, the 
court of appeals had affirmed the ALJs’ consideration of “the claimant’s commutable labor market” in 
deciding “permanent and total disability” PTD.  Id. at 552-53.  In the third case, however, the court of 
appeals reversed, declaring “disability is a function of impairment, not geography or job availability.”  Id.at 
553.  In all three cases, both administrative law judges and administrative appellate bodies had declared the 
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crux of the inquiry, the court said, was whether employment is “reasonably available to 
the claimant given his or her circumstances.”269 Because it was not the fault of these 
rural workers that the rural economy provided them no job opportunities, they could 
receive benefits.  They were not required to commute long distances or to move in order 
to secure replacement employment.270 
Other courts have been similarly empathic regarding the practical consequences 
of rural residents’ spatial isolation, holding, for example, that an insurer must pay the 
transportation costs associated with obtaining necessary treatment.271 As one court 
expressed it, “for citizens living miles from our cities the inability to obtain compensation 
for transportation expenses may result in life sustaining medical treatment being 
unavailable.”272 In another matter, the Colorado Supreme Court held that an insurer 
should reimburse a claimant’s wife for providing home health care services, which had 
been prescribed by his physician, when home health care services were unavailable in his 
 
workers to be permanently and totally disabled, but the Colorado Court of Appeals had reached 
inconsistent results.  
269 Id. at 557.  In Parsons v. Employment Security Commission, 71 N.M. 405, 379 P.2d 57 (1963), a woman 
who had worked as a grocery clerk quit her job and moved with her husband, who had been laid off, to 
property they owned in a rural community with only one grocery story.  The woman was unable to secure 
work at the grocery store, or at either of the two stores within commutable distance.  She did not want to 
work as a waitress or secretary and was therefore unable to secure employment.  The Commission found 
that her voluntary unemployment made her ineligible for benefits, but the New Mexico Supreme Court 
reversed, finding that she had made reasonable efforts to secure employment.  Id. at 411, 379 P.2d at 61.  
See also Wood Mosaic Co. v. Brown, 199 S.W.2d 433, 434 (Ky.Ct. App. 1947) (finding 64-year-old 
laborer who had worked as a carpenter, blacksmith, and coal miner to be permanently disabled when he 
injured his arm; court noted that in rural area where he lived, alternative “vocational opportunities” were 
restricted to very few fields).   
270 While the court never explicitly mentioned the claimants’ spatial isolation, it recognized the rural job 
market realities in its decision to uphold their status as permanently and totally disabled.  Indeed, the court 
wrote that considering a claimant’s access to employment is both reasonable and consistent with the “Act’s 
purpose of assisting injured workers who are unable to secure employment.”  Id. at 557.  Dissenting Justice 
Kourlis explicitly mentioned the rural nature of the claimants’ locales, stating that they “may have to move 
in order to find work, just as someone who is laid off may need to move.”  Id. at 561.  He argued 
vigorously that “access to employment within the labor market where a claimant resides is not an 
appropriate factor to consider” in awarding PTD benefits.  Id. 
271 See, e.g., Allstate Insurance Company v. Smith, 902 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Colo. 1995) 
272 Id. at 1388.   
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rural community.273 In a similar vein, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that an insurer 
must pay for a physician-prescribed hot tub in the claimant’s home when the rural locale 
in which he lived made travel to a health club unfeasible.274 
Cases such as these demonstrate judicial empathy for the hardships – including 
financial costs – associated with spatial isolation, a hallmark of rural life.  They also 
recognize that such hardships aggravate the economic vulnerability that is a constant for 
many rural residents.  Such decisions stand in stark contrast to the lack of understanding 
judges have shown about these hardships and vulnerability in relation to abortion access, 
as well as other issues with particular impact on rural women. 
b.  Judicial Bypass Procedures and Lack of Anonymity.  Rural women have 
also been acknowledged in abortion litigation challenging judicial bypass procedures for 
minors.  The issues in these cases have been both the spatial isolation associated with 
rural places and the lack of anonymity people experience there.  The 1999 decision of the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Memphis Planned Parenthood v. Sundquist is a case in 
point.275 Sundquist examined a Tennessee law that permitted minors to seek judicial 
bypass of the parental consent requirement, but which imposed several restrictions on the 
process.   The minor was required, for example, to file her petition in either the county in 
which she resided or in which the abortion was sought, and to swear that she consulted 
 
273 Suetrack USA v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 902 P.2d 854, 855-56 (Colo. 1995) 
274 Continental Casualty Ins. Co. v. McDonald, 567 So.2d 1208 (Ala. 1990).  The insurer in that case was 
found liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress for unreasonably delaying payments to the 
claimant’s health care providers, causing some of them to deny him services and pain medication.  Id. at 
1210.  With respect to the hot tub, the insurer had challenged the doctor’s recommendation, repeatedly 
asking him to justify it.  Id. at 1214-15.  The insurer then took the position that the unavailability of a health 
club was due to “McDonald's own decision to live in a rural area and that CNA would not want to pay for 
an expensive hot tub and then have to install another one if McDonald moved.”  Id. at 1215. The appellate 
court upheld the intentional infliction of emotional distress judgment.   
275 175 F.3d 456 (6th Cir.1999).   
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with a physician about the abortion before seeking the bypass.276 The majority upheld 
the law as constitutional.277 
Judge Keith, in dissent, discussed at length the particular hurdles faced by rural 
minors seeking to use the procedure.  He focused on both transportation and 
confidentiality problems.  With regard to the former, he noted the lack of trains and the 
fact that even “buses do not reach the rural areas.”278 With respect to the latter, Judge 
Keith observed that a “minor’s actions can easily be detected by relatives and friends in 
rural areas.” 279 He included in his opinion numerous detailed anecdotes from the 
testimony of officials at Memphis’ and Knoxville’s abortion providers.  The director of 
counseling at the Knoxville Center for Reproductive Health testified about problems 
arising from the law’s venue restriction:   
The areas surrounding Knoxville where many of our patients come from 
are very rural.   It is next to impossible to go to any public place 
completely undetected. One minor patient told us she couldn't pursue a 
waiver from the local court because her aunt worked there.   Another tried 
to pursue a waiver in her home county, only to discover the judge assigned 
to her case was her former Sunday school teacher.   She was so afraid of 
appearing in front of someone who knew her and her parents that she left 
and did not pursue the waiver. 280 
While lack of anonymity prevented minors from applying for judicial bypass in their 
home counties, the director also expounded on the difficulties created by the alternative:  
traveling to the county where the abortion provider is located to apply for judicial bypass 
there.  Noting that some patients must travel as far as six hours to reach Knoxville for an 
 
276 Id. at 459-60.   
277 Id. at 461.   
278 Id. at 474 (quoting declaration of  Judy G. Stogner, Director of Clinical Services at Memphis Planned 
Parenthood)  
279 Id. at 476.  “Minors who do not have cars, which are most of our clients, must arrange transportation 
with a friend or a trusted relative.  Often rides do not show up and they have to re-schedule.” Id. (quoting 
Declaration of Connie Simpson, Director of Counseling at the Knoxville Center for Reproductive Health). 
280 Id. at 485 (emphasis original).   
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abortion, the director testified that most minors can only get there once – for the medical 
procedure.281 
The Director of the Memphis Center for Reproductive Health similarly touched 
on the confidentiality and transportation issues that plague minors living in rural areas.  
She shared the anecdote of a patient who was reluctant to get from her local bank a 
money order made payable to the abortion clinic.  The woman had feared that the tellers, 
who knew her, might disclose her activities to others.282 The director attested to the 
particular difficulties minors have in going undetected because the lack of public 
transportation in rural Tennessee leaves them relying on friends or extended family for 
transportation, while also factoring in as much as four hours of travel time each way.283 
Judge Keith responded to this evidence with a compelling and compassionate 
summation of the situations faced by many young women seeking abortions.  He gave 
special attention to the additional challenges facing those who live in rural areas:   
Sitting in its "ivory tower," the majority ignores the realities of the 
situation and claims that making phone calls over a forty-eight hour period 
cannot be characterized as a substantial burden, thereby mocking the 
plight of these young girls for whom making a single telephone call, 
particularly during the court's business hours, may mean walking a long 
distance in a rural area to make a toll call from a public telephone, all 
without arousing suspicion or having her conversation overheard and her 
confidentiality destroyed. 
* * *
Furthermore, in the case of small rural towns where this type of bypass 
may most likely be sought, the minors may feel that their confidentiality 
and anonymity are also at stake if they have to contact a law office where 
a relative or acquaintance may be employed as support staff.284 
281 Id.   
282 Id. at 486-87.   
283 Id. at 486-87.   
284 Id. at 478.   
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Judge Keith thus took seriously the hardships the Tennessee law created – because of 
spatial isolation and lack of anonymity – for young rural women in particular.   
 But judicial responses to lack of anonymity in other contexts have been more 
realistic and empathic than the majority in Sundquist. As is the case with spatial 
isolation, courts outside the abortion context have held the lack of anonymity with which 
rural residents live to be legally relevant.  That rural residents are aware of community 
events and each others’ lives is noted in both civil and criminal decisions.285 One court 
assumed, for example, that an informant was more credible because the “basis of his 
knowledge sprang . . . from rural soil rather than from the faceless anonymity of an urban 
swarm.”286 The court characterized reputation in a rural place as “better 
substantiated.”287 The lack of anonymity associated with rural communities arises most 
often in relation to whether a defendant can get a fair trial in a rural venue.288 A North 
 
285 See, e.g., Roberts v. Dutton, 368 F.2d 465, 470 (5th Cir.1966) (taking judicial notice that in a rural 
county “information concerning witnesses and events is more generally known than in large cities”) cited in 
Foxworth v. Florida, 267 So.2d 647, 651 (Fla. 1972); State v. Havlena, 1998 WL 939628 (Neb. App. 1998) 
(circumstances of convict ordered to pay restitution not a “deep secret” in rural community). 
286 Stanley v. State, 19 Md. App. 507, 521 n.7, 313 A.2d 847, 856, n. 7 (1974) (citing United States v. 
Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971)).     
287 Id. See also Idaho v. Missamore, 114 Idaho 879, 880-881 (1988) (police officer stopped defendant 
driver based on his personal knowledge that defendant had no drivers license).  
288 See, e.g., State v. Brown, 4 Kan. App. 2d 729, 734 (1980)(exercise of peremptory challenges in 
chambers is acceptable in rural areas because jurors are often known to parties and counsel); State v. 
Hunter,  241 Kan. 629, 636 (1987) (suggesting jury selection should be more closely scrutinized in rural 
areas where it is “inevitable that members of jury panel will be acquainted with trial participants or 
victims”); Knapp v. Leonardo, 46 F.3d 170, 181 (2d Cir. 1995)(Oakes, J., dissenting)(arguing for grant of 
habeas petition because 83% of 1417 members of jury pool were disqualified for cause from “emotionally 
super-charged” trial in rural New York).   
Mere acquaintance by jurors with party or attorney is often insufficient to justify a change in 
venue or to constitute error.  See, e.g., Jernigan v. State, 475 S.W.2d 184, 185-86 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971) 
(“many cases are tried in rural areas wherein all of the jurors know all of the lawyers, litigants and 
witnesses” and this is not necessarily grounds for mistrial); Peyton v. State, 897 So.2d 921, 953-54 (Miss. 
2003) (“not unusual for potential jurors to know parties and witnesses in trials” in rural areas, but where 
jurors assure courts they can be impartial, no error to permit them to serve on jury); Toyota Motor Corp. v. 
McLaurin, 642 So.2d 351, 359-61 (Miss. 1994)(McRae, dissenting) (“in our rural state the situation where 
most citizens of a county have  had someone in their family represented by either party’s counsel occurs 
more often than not”); State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1977)(“almost impossible, in some of our 
rural counties, to choose a jury who did not know witnesses and did not know the parties or something 
about the parties”; knowledge alone insufficient to disqualify from jury service); Dupuy v. Allara, 457 
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Carolina decision, for example, held that the defendant could not have gotten a fair trial 
in a "small, rural and closely-knit county where the entire county was, in effect, a 
neighborhood.”289 
The issue of possible bias also arises in civil cases.  A Mississippi trial judge in 
1985 referred to “these rural counties that we have in Mississippi where the people know 
each other.”290 The North Dakota Supreme Court wrote in 1994 that “in nearly all 
counties in our state . . . most jurors know something about every person in the county, 
their families, or their businesses.”291 Judges refer to “gossip”292 or “word-of-mouth 
publicity,”293 that may interfere with a defendant’s ability to get a fair trial in a rural 
locale.294 
S.E.2d 494, 499 (W.Va. 1995)(“fact of life that in many rural jurisdictions” local physicians are likely to 
have contacts with prospective jurors); Keyes v. Amundson, 343 N.W.2d 78, 86-87 (N.D. 1983) (noting 
unavoidability of jurors viewing accident scenes in rural counties).   
289 State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 256, 307 S.E. 2d 339, 348 (1983).  The court overturned the conviction 
and granted a new trial to defendant who had been tried in a county with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants.  
The victim in that case was “a well-known and respected dairy farmer,” and a third of potential jurors had 
“acknowledged familiarity” with him or some member of his family.  State v. Vereen, 312 N.C. 499, 510, 
324 S.E.2d 250 (1985) (distinguishing case at bar from facts of Jerrett).  Cf State v. McKisson, 2003 WL 
21649214, at *6 (N.C.App.) (unpublished case) (upholding denial of change of venue where jurors did 
not personally know victims or their families, in spite of defendant’s arguments that crime had “rocked” 
rural county and pretrial publicity had “infected” jury pool). 
290 Great American Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Dawson, 468 So.2d 87, 90-91 (Miss. 1985).   
291 State v. Brooks, 520 N.W.2d 796, 802 (N.D. 1994) (Meschke, J., concurring) (justifying N.D. Rev. 
606(b) which does not permit affidavits, evidence, or testimony by a juror about the jury’s discussion, even 
when a juror discloses to the others some personal knowledge about a party).   See also Farmers Union 
Grain Terminal Ass’n v. Nelson, 223 N.W.2d 494 (1974) (noting difficulty in finding a family in a rural 
community that had not done business with defendant-owned or operated facility, but this would not 
indicate a direct relationship that should disqualify from jury service).   
292 See, e.g., People v. Nesler, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454, 476 & n.1 (Cal. 1997) (“hometown trial” in rural 
community “entailed the strong chance that jurors would hear gossip about the case and about defendant”; 
court referred to “likelihood of local gossip, rumor, and discussion of the case within this close-knit 
community”); State v. Breding, 526 N.W.2d 465, 468-469 (N.D. 1995) (defendant argued that “rumor, 
gossip, and speculation ‘small community living generates as a matter of course’ should have been 
sufficient alone” to support his motion for change of venue but court refused, noting that to accept 
argument would require change of venue in every serious criminal prosecution in rural county). 
293 State v. White, 311 N.C. 238, 242, 316 S.E.2d 42, 44 (1984). 
294 See, e.g., Wolfe v. Brigano, 232 F.3d 499, 500-04  & n.1 (6th Cir. 2000)(Wellford, J., concurring) (trial 
judge acknowledged “we’re in a small community and you hear matters, and . . .you read things”); Roberts 
v. C.W. Adams & Son Co., 110 S.W.314, 316 (Ky. App. 1908)(describing rural neighborhood “where 
everybody knows in a general way everybody’s business”).   
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In light of judicial recognition, in a range of legal contexts, of the familiarity or 
lack of anonymity that characterizes rural areas, judicial failure to take seriously this 
reality as it relates to abortion regulations is especially unfortunate.  In an early essay on 
Roe v. Wade, MacKinnon argued that most women do not control the conditions under 
which they have sex.  She asserted, for example, that women may be reluctant to use 
birth control because of its social meaning – specifically signaling a woman’s sexual 
availability.295 A related argument applies to rural women, who may be less likely to use 
contraceptives because of their lack of anonymity in seeking such services in their 
communities.  If this is true regarding contraceptives, it is surely also true regarding 
abortion, particularly given the more conservative attitudes rural residents hold on this 
subject.296 This is all the more reason rural women may be deterred from abortion by 
judicial bypass procedures that so casually risk their anonymity.   
 4. Conclusion 
 Given that abortion is the sole legal context in which courts have been confronted 
with realities of rural women as a class, it is an understatement to say that the response 
has been disappointing.  Casey and its progeny have consistently discounted or denied the 
impact that spatial isolation and lack of anonymity have on rural women who seek to 
exercise their constitutional right to procure an abortion.  Suggesting that physical 
distance, lack of transportation, and economic vulnerability are insufficient to deter 
women from pursuing an abortion – that they are not substantial obstacles – is callous 
and insulting.  This is particularly so when those deciding sit, as Judge Hamilton put it, 
 
295 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Privacy and Equality:  Beyond Roe v. Wade (1983) in FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 93-102 (1987), discussed in MARTHA CHAMALLAS,
INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 48 (2d ed. 2003).   
296 See supra notes [    ] and accompanying text.   
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amidst an urban sprawl, with myriad services and public transportation.297 
These decisions are especially disappointing in light of law’s recognition 
elsewhere of the hardships associated with this aspect of rural living.  Indeed, ironically, 
federal judges in another abortion context have called attention to the plight of rural 
women.  In contrast to the lack of empathy the same courts have shown to rural women in 
relation to application of the undue burden test, courts upholding the constitutionality of 
the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrance Act (“FACE”) have relied on the needs of rural 
women to justify their decisions.  In the 2000 decision in United States v. Gregg, for 
example, the Third Circuit upheld FACE, concluding that the misconduct it proscribes 
exacerbates the “shortage of abortion-related services exists in this country.”298 The 
court noted that 83 percent of all U.S. counties have no abortion provider, and that the 
shortage is particularly acute in rural areas because reproductive health clinics tend to be 
“located primarily in metropolitan areas.”299 Ironically, this is the same Court of Appeals 
which, in Casey, dismissed a statistic demonstrating that 82 percent of counties have no 
provider. “In  a rural community,” the Third Circuit wrote in Gregg, “only one provider 
usually exists in a large geographical area, thus making it a preferred target for anti-
abortionists because elimination of that provider eliminates abortion services for all 
 
297 See supra notes [   ] and accompanying text (discussing Casey’s core holding regarding waiting period). 
298 226 F.3d 253, 264 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing legislative record).  See also United States v. Bird, No. 95-
20792, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 33988 (5th Cir. Sept. 24, 1997) (upholding constitutionality of FACE, 
relying on Congress’s commerce clause power; among supporting facts was that only abortion provider in 
South Dakota commutes from Minnesota); United States v. White, 893 F. Supp. 1423 (C.D.Cal.1995) 
(finding that violent attacks on abortion facilities "sharply curtail access to health care for many women, 
particularly women living in rural areas").  Indeed, Terry v. Reno discusses how abortion violence in some 
rural areas forced medical clinics to "... stop providing not only abortions, but other reproductive services 
as well, including pre and post natal care."   101 F.3d 1412, 1416 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
299 Gregg, 226 F.3d at 264.    
- 69 -
women in that area.”300 
While Gregg and other FACE decisions have acknowledged rural realities 
associated with physical distance in the context of concluding that an interstate market 
for abortion services exists, courts applying the undue burden test have stubbornly 
downplayed this fact and the gravity of the obstacles it creates for rural women.  Gregg 
observed that the closure of an abortion provider would “eliminate abortion services for 
all women” in a rural area that had a single abortion provider.  But Casey and its progeny 
have assumed that rural women will be able to get abortions regardless of the distance 
they must travel to an abortion provider, even if they must make the trip twice.  Current 
“undue burden” precedents – in sharp contrast to Gregg’s “elimination” language – 
conclude that rural women will simply experience inconvenience in exercising this 
fundamental right.     
 
IV. Conclusion 
No law addresses the deepest, simplest, quietest, and most widespread 
atrocities of women’s everyday lives. The law that purports to address 
them . . . does not reflect their realities or . . . is not enforced.  It seems 
either the law does not exist, does not apply, is applied to women’s 
detriment, or is not applied at all.  The deepest rules of women’s lives are 
written beneath or between the lines, and on other pages.301 
Catharine A. MacKinnon (2005) 
Angela Harris argued almost two decades ago that, “to energize legal theory, we 
need to subvert it with narratives and stories, accounts of the particular, the different, the 
 
300 Id. at 264 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 103-306, at 8, U.S.C.C.A.N., at 705).  The cases do not discuss what the 
Senate considers to be "rural"; they do, however, mention particular states that are considered rural, such as 
Wisconsin. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-488, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1994, 1994 WL 168882 (May 2, 1994). 
301 MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS, supra note 3, at 34 (2005).  
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hitherto silenced.”302 I have begun here to do precisely that:  to energize feminist legal 
theory by surfacing the stories of rural women, one group who have been overlooked, 
misunderstood and thus silenced.  Rural women have been silenced not only because of 
the lack of power that stems from their socioeconomic disadvantage, but also because of 
their physical distance from public places, from centers of power, from services, and 
from opportunity of all sorts.  The deepest atrocities of their every day lives have often 
gone unseen, without legal redress due in part to that same isolation, but also because of 
our society’s pervasive urban presumption.  The vulnerability and hardship with which 
they live have been discounted – or simply held against them as their fault – as their 
children have been taken away, and as they have been faulted for their acts of self-
preservation.  The fundamental right to abortion has been denied to many of them as 
restrictions on that right have been upheld as inconsequential, even as evidence has 
shown how heavily the restrictions weigh upon them.   
Judges in many of the cases I have discussed may not understand that rural 
women generally have less economic, social, cultural and political power than both urban 
residents and rural men.  They may not understand that spatial isolation and lack of 
anonymity, for example, limit these women.  But if legal decision-makers do in fact 
understand these realities, they are foolish to assume that these women are free, equal and 
responsible when they fail to hold a job, contact their children, simply walk away from an 
abusive relationship, or get an abortion in the face of very real obstacles.303 
302 Harris, supra note 7 at 615.   
303 I analogize here to a statement by Catharine MacKinnon, who wrote:  “The assumption is that women 
can be unequal to men economically, socially, culturally, politically, and in religion, but the moment they 
have sexual interactions, they are free and equal.”  The Guardian, Interview with Catharine MacKinnon 
Are Women Human? (April 12, 2006), available at 
http://www.guardian.cog.uk/gender/story/0,,1751983,00.html.
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Rural women are not playing on the same field that urban women do any more 
than women of color are playing on the same field on which white women play.  We no 
longer presume that the same laws that will serve the interests of women in the United 
States will necessarily serve the interests of women in Azerbaijan or Norway or 
Mozambique.304 We understand that laws do not apply in a cultural vacuum.  Just as we 
have become sensitive to culture,305 we must become sensitive to place, to spatiality, to 
geography.  We must become sensitive to rurality, and we can only begin to do that by 
acknowledging its very existence, by learning to see it.     
 I have written in this article of rural women as a group, and I have claimed that 
they have many common concerns, although I am acutely aware of the differences among 
rural communities,306 as well as among rural women.  But “[e]ven a jurisprudence based 
on multiple consciousness must categorize,” for without categorization, each individual is 
isolated, and moral responsibility and social change are impossible.307 I thus name the 
category “rural women,” even while agreeing with Angela Harris that such categories 
should be “explicitly tentative, relational, and unstable.”308 
We must begin – and continue – to investigate the intersection between gender 
and spatiality, including its impact on autonomy and moral agency, the complexities of 
women’s productive and reproductive roles, and the web of connections that links these 
 
304 See, e.g., Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, G.A. Res. 
34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp (No. 46), at 193, U.N. Doc A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979).   
305 See, e.g., Leti Volpp, Feminism v. Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM L. REV. 1181 (2001); Madhavi Sunder, 
Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L. J. 1399 (2003). 
306 A common expression among rural scholars is, “When you’ve seen one rural area, you’ve seen one rural 
area.”  See Place Matters:  Addressing Rural Poverty, supra note 32, at 3.  See also J. Dennis Murray and 
Peter A. Keller, Psychology and Rural America:  Current Status and Future Directions, 46 AM. PSYCHOL.
220, 222 (March 1991) (noting diversity in cultures, occupations, wealth, lifestyles, and physical geography 
across rural America); Charles Fluharty, Refrain or Reality: A United States Rural Policy, 23 J. LEGAL 
MED. 57, 58 (2002) (that rural areas are so diverse is a public policy challenge).  
307 Harris, supra note 7, at 586.   
308 Id.  
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with societal and community expectations.309 Like any other aspect of one’s situation or 
any marker of identity, living in a rural area or “being a rural woman” does not exist in 
isolation.  Literary theorists Creed and Ching, in arguing for scholarly attention to the 
rural-urban dichotomy, have observed that “contemporary discussions of the 
fragmentation and recombination of identities locate this process almost exclusively in 
the city.”310 This must change if the law is to do justice in the lives of rural women.   
While I have begun the task of theorizing the rural, practical lessons should also 
be taken from my analysis and critique.311 First, it does not pay for advocates to be subtle 
about rural realities.  Lawyers litigating cases such as those I have discussed must be 
willing to explain how the rural context alters the power dynamics and limits actors’ 
options, whatever the legal right or issue at stake.  Judges and other legal decision-makers 
must be taught how rurality constrains autonomy and choice. 
 Second, the use of this word “rural” may disserve rural women.  I have 
characterized as “rural” many of the situations and settings I have discussed, just as the 
litigants, attorneys or judges did.  Rural women as litigants, however, might be wiser to 
use terms such as spatial isolation or lack of anonymity to focus upon the precise rural 
characteristic that is relevant to the inquiry.  Doing so should help moderate the rhetorical 
potency of the term “rural,” which so often carries positive, even idyllic associations.312 
Those associations and the notion that rural hardships are ameliorated by the scenic and 
 
309 See Tickamyer, supra note 4, at 723 (calling for inquiry into the “complexities of the relationship 
between women's productive and reproductive roles and activities, the ways these link to other societal and 
community roles and responsibilities, and notably, the intersection between gender and spatial dimensions 
of poverty and welfare”).  
310 KNOWING YOUR PLACE, supra note 2, at 3.  Professors Ching and Creed have also argued that “the city 
remains the locus of political economic and cultural power.”  Id. at 17.   
311 BAER, supra note 1, at 80.  “While we claim to derive theory from experience, the human mind cannot 
make sense of experience without some sort of theory, however rudimentary . . . it is misleading to say that 
theory comes from practice; they reinforce each other.”  Id.  
312 See Rural Rhetoric, supra note 8, at Part I (manuscript pages 12-15).   
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serene aspects of rural living may obscure or disguise the challenges the rural resident is 
facing.313 
As Judith Baer has observed, “[f]acts do not interpret themselves.” 314 Judges and 
juries apply law to facts and, in so doing, give legal meaning to those facts and determine 
their legal significance.  Those who care about the well-being of women – all women – 
must find new ways to help legal decision-makers understand the facts that comprise the 
context in which rural women live and make decisions.  Catharine MacKinnon has 
written that it is an “aspiration indigenous to women across place and across time” to be 
“no less than men . . . not to lead a derivative life, but to do everything and be anybody at 
all.”315 Rural women share that aspiration, and feminist theory can inform practice to 
help them realize it.    
 
313 Rural sociologists have observed the “largely nostalgic and romantic image of rural living” along with 
the myth of “country living and family life as simple, pure, and wholesome; slower paced; free from 
pressures and tension; and surrounded by pastoral beauty and serenity.”  Raymond T. Coward & William 
R. Smith, Jr., Families in Rural Society, in RURAL SOCIETY IN THE U.S.: ISSUES IN THE 1980S 77 (Don A. 
Dillman & Daryl J. Hobbs eds., 1982).  Rural communities are commonly envisioned as “safer, friendlier, 
better places to raise children, as having a simpler lifestyle, cleaner environment, and as being closer to 
outdoor recreation.”  Andrew J. Sofranko, Transitions in Rural Areas of the Midwest and Nation, in RURAL 
COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 21, 34 (Norman Walzer ed., 1991).  See also W.K. KELLOGG 
FOUND., THE MESSAGE FROM RURAL AMERICA 2004 VS. 2002 at 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.wkkf.org/Pubs/FoodRur/Media_Coverage_of_Rural_America_00253_04093.pdf.
(77% of terms media used to describe rural America in 2004 had a positive tone, including praise for 
residents’ behavior, e.g., “good values,” “strong work ethic,” and aesthetic judgments such as “picturesque” 
and “pastoral” while only 23% were negative).   
314 BAER, supra note 1, at 80.   
315 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Whose Culture? A Case Note on Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, in 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 295, at 63, 67-68.   
